Trump could also reach into Nixon’s playbook to incite some sort of military or foreign-policy crisis with Iran, China or North Korea to divert attention and rally public support for him as commander in chief. Two days after firing Cox, Nixon rattled Washington (and the world) when U.S. forces were put on Defcon 3—one step short of war—supposedly to deter a Soviet intervention in the Middle East. But with his presidency teetering the following August, concerns grew that Nixon might even deploy military units to Capitol Hill to evict Congress and forestall impeachment.
特朗普还可以借鉴尼克松的策略，在伊朗、中国或朝鲜问题上挑起某种军事或外交危机，转移人们的注意力，并争取公众对他担任总司令的支持。在解雇考克斯的两天后，尼克松令美国政府(和全世界)感到不安，当时美国军队被部署在距离战争仅一步之遥的防御工事上，据说是为了阻止苏联对中东的干预。但随着接下来的8月总统任期摇摇欲坠，人们越来越担心，尼克松甚至可能派遣军队到国会山，驱逐国会，阻止弹劾。
Nixon’s defense secretary James Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were keeping “a close watch to make certain that no orders were given to military units outside the normal chain of command,” according to a contemporary account in The Washington Post. “Specifically, there was concern that an order could go to a military unit outside the chain of command for some sort of action against Congress during the time between a House impeachment and a Senate trial.”
《华盛顿邮报》当时的一篇报道称，尼克松政府的国防部长詹姆斯·施莱辛格和参谋长联席会议一直在“密切关注，以确保不向正常指挥体系之外的军事单位下达任何命令”。“具体来说，有人担心在众议院弹劾和参议院审判之间的这段时间里，命令可能会落到指挥系统之外的某个军事单位手中，让他们对国会采取某种行动。”
In the end, nothing came of it, as Nixon accepted the secret promise of a pardon from Vice President Gerald Ford if he would leave office quickly, according to subsequent accounts through the years. But to others, it was a close call. During a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1973, 10 months into the televised Senate Watergate committee hearings, Nixon “kept on referring to the fact that he may be the last hope, the eastern elite was out to get him. ‘This is our...last chance to resist the fascists (of the left),’” recalled one of the chiefs in a 1983 Atlantic Monthly piece by journalist Seymour Hersh. “His words brought me straight up out of my chair. I felt the President, without the words having been said, was trying…to find out whether in a crunch there was support to keep him in power.”
最后，尼克松什么也没得到，因为根据后来多年的报道，尼克松接受了副总统杰拉尔德·福特的秘密承诺，即如果他能迅速离任，将获赦免。但对其他人来说，这是千钧一发。1973年12月，在电视直播的参议院水门委员会听证会进行了10个月后，尼克松与参谋长联席会议召开会议。‘这是我们……抵抗(左翼)法西斯分子的最后机会,’”《大西洋月刊》记者西摩·赫什在一篇文章中提到的一位领导于1983年回忆道。“他的话让我从椅子上惊坐起来。他说:“我不知道为什么，我觉得虽然总统没有说出来，但是在试图……看看在关键时刻是否有人支持他继续掌权。”
Others thought Schlesinger, in particular, had been overcome by a kind of Seven Days in May paranoia. The defense secretary had come “unglued,” one of the chiefs said.
另一些人则认为，施莱辛格在5月份的偏执被一种7天妄想症控制了。其中一名官员说，国防部长“脱臼了”。
译文由可可原创，仅供学习交流使用，未经许可请勿转载。
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