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MESOPOTAMIA, the ancient name for Iraq, means “land between the rivers”. Today, though, the lines which divide the country, not those which circumscribe it, matter most. In the north and south people are emerging from the deepest of traumas into a world of possibilities. The virtually independent Kurdish region and the oil-rich Shia provinces already enjoy peace and a fair, or rising, degree of prosperity. Between them, though, the heart of the country is trapped in ethnic and sectarian strife, vicious political factionalism and foreign meddling. Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, behaves like a mafia don; his bickering rivals look little better.
美索不达米亚，伊拉克古时称谓，意谓“两河之间的土地”。可如今，分割伊拉克的线条，而非环绕限定伊拉克的条框，更重要，在北部和南部，人们已远离伤痛，奔向无限可能的世界。事实上已经独立的库尔德地区以及石油丰富的什叶派省份也已尽享和平以及不错的繁荣，而且还在不断走向繁荣。不过，在他们中间，该国的中心地区却饱受民族、宗教冲突，党派纷争以及外国势力干涉。伊拉克总理努里·卡迈勒·马利基表现得如同黑手党头目，其斗争对手也好不了多少。
Ten years after the invasion grandly called Operation Iraqi Freedom, and barely 15 months after the last American troops left, the signs of their arrival and passing are scant. Aside from the giant new American embassy in the capital, Baghdad, the monuments of triumph are concrete barriers and checkpoints, fleets of discarded gas guzzlers and the jarring sight of Iraqi soldiers decked out like GIs with sunglasses over their eyes, night-vision gear strapped to their helmets, laser torches and M4 rifles by their sides. Less tangible but more pervasive are the dashed hopes and unfulfilled promises. “They spent a trillion dollars and didn’t leave us a single building,” sniffs an Iraqi politician who once cheered America’s presence.
被冠以“伊拉克自由行动”的入侵已过10年，距最后一批美军离开伊拉克也刚过去15个月了，而美军到来与离去标记也明显不足。除了位于首都巴格达新建的巨型美国大使馆，美军胜利所留下的也多见于混凝土障碍、检查站，成堆废弃的燃油机动车，以及那些刺眼的伊拉克士兵，装扮的如同美国大兵，佩戴着太阳镜，头盔上系着夜视装备，身旁还配着激光电筒及M4步枪。而相比这些有形的，更多的是破灭的希望和不能兑现的承诺。一位曾欢呼美军入侵的伊拉克政客讽刺道：“他们花费了万亿美元却连一栋建筑都没留给我们。”
That is a bit harsh. Even Iraqis with bitter memories of the invasion and occupation, the death toll from which has never been definitively established, accept that without foreign armies they could never have toppled Saddam Hussein, the tyrant who dragged the country from calamity to disaster over the three decades to 2003. “They lifted the lid on the tomb we lived in,” says Sarmand al-Taie, a newspaper columnist. “It’s not their fault we haven’t completely climbed out.” The Americans made terrible mistakes, yes, but so have we, is a common refrain.
听起来可能有些刺耳。事实上，虽然伊拉克民众回忆起美军的入侵与占领还是怨恨不已，对因此而造成的死亡人数至今没有正式公布而满腹牢骚，不过他们也承认如果没有外国军事力量，他们也不可能推翻萨达姆·侯赛因--在2003年之前的30年这位暴君一步步将伊拉克由不幸拖入到无底深渊。新闻专栏记者 Sarmand al-Taie说，“我们生活在坟墓之中，美军移除了坟墓顶盖。虽然我们没有完全从中爬出来，可这不是美军的错。”美军犯了严重的错误，的确，不过我们也一样， 如此反反复复。
The cities, not long after
城市，不久以后
Baghdad, where just under a fifth of Iraq’s 33m people now live, remains a maze of compounds and security cordons. On a recent Friday, getting from the city’s old bazaar to Firdos Square, just three kilometres (two miles) away, required a 21km detour. Iraqis endure endless checkpoint queues in return for a lower chance of being caught in a blast or shoot-out. The frequency of attacks has fallen drastically since the sectarian bloodletting of 2006-07, and seven of Iraq’s 18 provinces have murder rates lower than Canada’s. But in Baghdad and the provinces around it outrages still recur with numbing regularity. On February 17th a wave of car bombs in Shia parts of Baghdad killed at least 30 people.
伊拉克3300万人中，不到五分之一居住在巴格达。如今巴格达俨然成了建筑群与安全隔离区交织的迷宫。上周五，要想从室内的老集市去三公里（2英里）之外的“天堂广场”(Firdos Square)，需要绕道走21公里。伊拉克民众忍受着检查站长长的行进人群，只为降低被爆炸和枪战击中的几率。自2007-2007年的宗派流血以来，暴力事件发生率已急剧下降，伊拉克18各省份中的7个谋杀率比加拿大还低。不过在巴格达及周边省份暴行此起彼伏，令人麻木不仁。2月17日巴格达什叶派聚居区发生新一轮汽车爆炸，造成至少30人死亡
The capital has some new buildings and fancy shop fronts. But they are rare, suggesting that private investment remains a timid trickle. Armies of street vendors plying their trade through the traffic jams reflect the fact that less than 40% of Iraqi adults have a job, and that a quarter of families live below the World Bank’s poverty line, statistics little improved since the dark days of crushing UN sanctions in the 1990s. Asked how many students Mustansiriya University has, one of them replies glumly that there are about 12,000, “which means we add 4,000 to the ranks of unemployed every year.”
巴格达有些新建筑物和高档商店店面。但是这些还是很稀少，这表明私人投资仍然谨慎量出。街边小贩在拥挤的道路上做起小买卖，这反映出一个事实：伊拉克只有不到40%的人拥有工作，四分之一的家庭生活在世界银行公布的贫困线以下。自上世纪90年代联合国对伊实施沉重的制裁以来，统计数字并未有明显改善。当问到穆斯坦西里亚大学(Mustansiriya University)有多少学生时，其中一人伤心地说大约12000人，“这也就是说我们每年要向失业大军中输送4000人”。
Umm Wafa, who with three daughters shares space among 580 other families in an abandoned military hospital on the city’s tattered outskirts, reckons just 5% of her fellow squatters earn a steady income. The house she was forced to flee in the Dora district, occupied now by hostile Sunni neighbours, stands tauntingly close. She gets no state support, and has yet to win compensation for her property despite seven years of government promises. Some 370,000 other internal refugees crowd Baghdad, half in unserviced squatter settlements.
在混乱不堪的市郊，Umm Wafa 和她的三个女儿居住在一座废弃的军事医院，与他们同住的还有另外580户家庭。Umm Wafa估计在此居住的人中，只有5%的有稳定收入。她被迫离开他在多拉地区的房子。该房如今被敌对的逊尼派人霸占，嘲笑般地矗立在旁边。 她没有国家支持，没有得到财产补偿，尽管政府已承诺了7年。另有国内还有37万难民涌向巴格达，其中的一半住在无人管理的棚户区。
A dozen checkpoints and a 150km of potholed highway to the south the picture looks impressively different. New flyovers lit by solar-powered lamps, multi-storey car parks and flashy hotels ring the centre of Najaf, a focal point of Shia pilgrimage. The city’s biggest attraction, the shrine of Imam Ali, is getting new gilding on its dome. A $600m, 56,000 square metre extension, designed by Iranian architects, will triple its footprint. The chamber of commerce boasts of $7 billion of foreign investment. “I’m optimistic about the future of this city,” says Haidar Salman, a professor at the city’s Islamic University, “but not so much about Iraq.”
经过一系列检查站，在凹凸不平的高速公路上向南行驶150公里之后，画面截然相反，给人深刻印象。使用太阳灯能路灯的立交桥，多层停车场和光彩夺目的酒店环绕着纳贾夫中心--纳贾夫是什叶派的朝圣中心。该市最具吸引力的地方就是伊玛姆阿里的神殿，如今其圆顶也刚被镀上金。而由伊朗设计师设计的扩建项目将是其面积的三倍；该项目造价6亿美元，占地面积达56000平方米。商会声称外资达到70亿美元。该市伊斯兰大学的教授Haidar Salman表示：“我对该市的未来很乐观，不过对伊拉克我就没这么乐观了。”
Najaf’s Shia seminaries, historically pre-eminent, were overshadowed during Saddam’s rule by those of the rival Iranian holy city of Qom. Now they have reclaimed their place, says Sheikh Fouad al-Torfi, a mullah imprisoned by both Saddam and the Americans. Najaf’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is accepted by nearly all the world’s 150m Shias as the brightest light of the age. Most Shia religious authorities, Iranians among them, have opened offices here, some attracted by greater freedom compared with Qom.
纳贾夫的什叶派神学院在历史上杰出非凡，不过在萨达姆统治时期却在伊朗圣城库姆的竞争下，不禁黯然失色。毛拉（伊斯兰教神学家）Sheikh Fouad al-Torfi说，如今这些学院已重夺其地位。Sheikh Fouad al-Torfi曾被萨达姆和美军曾囚禁过。纳贾夫大阿雅图拉西斯塔尼(Ali al-Sistani)几乎被全球一亿五千万什叶派民众接受为当今最明亮的星光。大多数的什叶派当局，包括伊朗，都在该地设有办公室，其中的因该地比库姆拥有更大的自由而被吸引过来。
The Shia Mecca’s revival is fuelled by a dynamic private sector. The same is true of Kurdistan, which is also booming; it even enjoys power 24 hours a day. In the centre, though, creaky bureaucracy, bickering politicians and lingering insecurity stymie Iraq’s progress. The state employs 3.5m people—65% of the workforce—and accounts for 70% of GDP. It relies for its income almost entirely on oil revenues, which now average $8 billion a month. A recent survey by the International Energy Agency suggests exports could double by 2020, though this will not be easy (see box on next page).
私营部门的活跃也刺激了什叶派麦加的复苏。同样繁荣的还有库尔德斯坦，那里每天24小时电力供应。尽管在伊拉克中心，腐朽的官僚主义、喋喋不休的政客以及挥之不去的安全隐患都阻碍了该国的发展。国家雇佣了350万人--65%的劳动力--贡献了GDP的70%。国家收入几乎全部依赖石油收入，如今平均月收入达到80亿美元。国际能源署的最新报告显示到2020年，出口将加倍，尽管实现起来并不轻松（见下页图表）
In much of the country the private sector is shackled. The World Bank ranks Iraq 165th out of the 185 places rated in its latest index on the ease of doing business; it says that shipping a container in or out of Iraq takes four times as long, and costs three times as much, as it tends to elsewhere in the region. Worse, the bank reports no legislative attempts in the past five years to make access to credit easier or speed the procedures to start a business. Iraq’s lawmakers have been too busy fighting political battles and dividing spoils among parties to attend to such practicalities. The electricity in Baghdad seldom stays on more than a few hours at a time, though new plants are being built.
伊拉克大部分地区，私营部门备受束缚。在世界银行评估的185个国家经商容易度指数中，伊拉克排在第165位。世行表示向伊拉克进出集装箱所花费的时间是向该地区其他国家进出的4倍，花费也是其他国家的三倍。更糟糕的是，世行表示在过去的五年伊拉克并没有进行立法以使信贷更便捷或加快开办生意流程。伊拉克立法员一直忙于政治相斗和分割党派战利品，根本无暇顾及这些事务。巴格达电力供应很难一次维持数小时，尽管新工厂还在不断新建。
Najaf and the south are doing so much better than Baghdad largely because the Shia majority there feels satisfied with the post-war settlement. From 1546, when the port city of Basra was captured by the Ottoman empire, to the invasion of 2003, Sunni-led states held sway over the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, although the most thickly populated part of the country, south of Baghdad, is largely Shia (see map). The Shia sense of disenfranchisement peaked under Saddam and his mostly Sunni henchmen, whose notion of nation-building included genocide against Kurds and mass execution for members of Shia religious parties they thought allied to Iran. The regime’s previously indiscriminate brutality took a sectarian turn after a failed Shia uprising in 1991.
纳贾夫及南部地区比巴格达表现得如此之好很大程度上是因为两地的主要派什叶派对战后稳定秩序满意。从1546年港口城市巴士拉被奥斯曼帝国占领到2003年美军入侵，逊尼派领导的政府一直统治着底格里斯河和幼发拉底河流域，尽管伊拉克大部分人口稠密的地区，如巴格达南部，逊尼派是主体。什叶派对公民权被剥夺的意识在萨达姆及其主要是逊尼派追随者的统治下达到最高峰，萨达姆建国的计划就包括对库尔德人实行种族灭绝，对他们声称与伊朗有联系的什叶派团体成员实行大规模杀戮。1991年什叶派起义失败后，萨达姆政权先前不分青红皂白的残暴蛮横开始转向宗派上来。
Understandably, Shias are tempted to regard their current dominance of Iraqi politics with righteous triumphalism. Since the first democratic elections in 2005, Shia-led parties, many of them with clerical or Islamist roots, have had a majority in Iraq’s parliament, as well as the prime minister’s office. They control local government in nine southern provinces. Ordinary Shias share the Najafi businessman’s contempt for Baghdad’s political logjam. Sunni claims of having become Iraq’s new, marginalised underclass fall on deaf ears.
这也就很容易理解，如今什叶派试图捍卫在伊拉克政治的优势地位，坚信正义必胜。2005年伊拉克举行首次民主选举以来，什叶派领导的政党--其中的许多有着教士或伊斯兰根源，如今在伊拉克议会，以及总理办公室都占多数。在南部九个省份，他们也控制着当地政府。普通什叶派民众也和纳贾夫的商人一样，对巴格达政治僵局嗤之以鼻。逊尼派声称已成为伊拉克新一批被边缘化的下层民众，却并未被理睬。
After the tables turned
局势转变之后，
Since mid-December mass protests in the style of the Arab spring have kicked off in Sunni-majority provinces to the north and west of Baghdad. The trigger was the arrest of more than 100 men in the entourage of Rafi Issawi, Mr Maliki’s Sunni minister of finance. A similar move by police units controlled by the prime minister forced Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni deputy prime minister, into exile in 2011. In Mr Issawi’s case all but nine bodyguards were soon released, but the arrests still raised simmering Sunni anger to its boiling point.
自12月中期以来，在巴格达北部、西部以逊尼派为主体的省份爆发了类似阿拉伯之春的大规模游行示威。导火索就是100多名拉菲·埃萨维（Rafi Issawi）的工作人员遭到逮捕。拉菲·埃萨维是马利基政府内的逊尼派财政部长。而此前，由总理控制的警察局也有过类似的行动：2011年迫使逊尼派副总统塔里克·哈希米（Tariq al-Hashemi）流往国外。在埃萨维事件中，九名保镖将很快获释，但是其余工作人员依然被关押，这无疑还是会将逊尼派激怒到爆发点。
That should have come as no surprise. Diplomats reckon that Iraq’s myriad security services in recent months have held something like 10,000 people, disproportionately Sunnis, in custody on terrorism-related charges. This is similar to the number once held by American forces. The Baghdad government has suspended salaries the Americans paid to Sunni militiamen. The residents of some Sunni parts of Baghdad are subjected to humiliating searches when leaving their neighbourhoods; on Fridays, days of prayer and protest, they are not let out at all.
这也在意料之中。外交官员估计伊拉克庞大的安全机构在最近数月拘捕了约10000人，其中的逊尼派比例严重失衡，他们都因与恐怖组织相关连而被收押。这与美军曾关押的数字大抵相当。伊拉克政府也冻结了美军付给逊尼派军事人员的薪水。巴格达部分逊尼派聚居区的民众离开家后便遭到羞辱性的搜查；在周五的祷告日和游行示威期间，他们更是不能出门。
Mr Maliki has responded to Sunni protests with concessions, promises and veiled threats. A committee he formed to hear their demands says it has released more than 2,000 prisoners, and resumed or increased salaries for 74,000 militiamen. Despite one incident in January when police opened fire on a mob in Falluja, an ever-restive Sunni city, killing five, security forces have for the most part avoided confronting protesters.
马利基在回应逊尼派的抗议时，做出了让步、承诺以及隐含的威胁。马利基组建了一个专门的委员会，倾听示威者的要求。该委员会表示已释放2000多名嫌犯，重新发放并提高了74000名军事人员的薪水。尽管一月份在费卢杰(Falluja)--顽固无比的逊尼派城市，警方朝示威人群开火，造成五人死亡，但是安全部队在大多数情况下一直避免正面对抗示威者。
Shia politicians warn that their own constituents are increasingly alarmed by the sight of Baathist slogans and jihadist banners in the Sunni protests. They are terrified that the increasingly sectarian civil war in Syria could create a hostile, Sunni-led post-Assad neighbour. Some speak of the need to rearm and prepare for another round of sectarian conflict.
什叶派政客警告称，其本派民众也越来越担心逊尼派示威游行中出现的复兴社会党（Baathist）的口号及圣战组织标语。他们担心叙利亚不断升级的宗派内战会促使产生一个充满敌意的、逊尼派领导的支持阿萨德的团体。一些人则指出需要重新武装，为新一轮的宗派争斗做准备。
Mr Maliki, who first came to power as a compromise prime minister in 2005 and then patched together a flimsy government in 2010, bears much of the blame for provoking these tensions. The move against Mr Issawi baffled Iraqi and foreign observers, who see Mr Maliki’s grudging response to the subsequent anger as foolishly inadequate. The grievances of the Sunnis who feel ignored go beyond salaries and harsh policing to a more general anger over rampant corruption and resentment of Mr Maliki’s dictatorial tendencies.
2005年各方妥协之下马利基首次就任伊拉克总理，随后于2010年拼凑脆弱的新一届政府。如今对局势的不断激化紧张，马利基承担大部分责任。这起针对埃萨维行动使得伊拉克国内及国外的观察者难以理解。他们认为马利基对随之而发生的怨恨回应过于吝啬，愚蠢可笑。逊尼派民众感到备受忽视，他们已由原先对薪水及暴力执法的愤怒，演变为对贪污成风的普遍恼怒，对马利基政府越来越独裁的怨恨。
Yet most observers seem to think Iraq can avoid returning to mayhem. Few in Iraq’s political class relish the idea of renewed conflict, says a London-based analyst. He cites as positive signs that Sunni protests have remained peaceful so far, and that calls for the removal of Mr Maliki or scrapping the 2005 constitution, the drafting of which most Sunni politicians boycotted to their later regret, have failed to gain traction. Some Shia politicians, including Muqtada al-Sadr, a young cleric with a strong following who was long branded a dangerous firebrand, have even voiced sympathy with Sunni demands.
不过大部分观察家倾向于伊拉克可以避免重返混乱无序的状态。伦敦的一位分析家表示，在伊拉克政治阶层，几乎没有人考虑重挑争端。逊尼派的游行示威迄今和平有序；要求罢免马利基或废除2005年宪法（绝大多数的逊尼派后来后悔抵制该法的起草）的呼声也没能得到响应。他表示这些都是积极的信号。Muqtada al-Sadr是位年轻的牧师，拥有很强的号召力，长期以来一直被视为是危险的煽动叛乱的人。如今他和其他一些什叶派政治家呼吁关心同情逊尼派的诉求。
If there is no dire reason to fear things getting worse, though, there is not much hope for improvement either. Iraq’s politics are a mess of micro-parties in ever-shifting alliances. In the 2010 elections a centrist, secular-leaning bloc, Iraqiya, actually won more seats than Mr Maliki’s party, but fell to bickering amid the peculiar reluctance of its leader, Iyad Allawi, to visit parliament. The political class’s rejection of seemingly sensible reforms and proclivity for intrigue and factionalism have strengthened Mr Maliki as much as his determination to divide and rule.
如果没有极端的理由担心局势会变得更差，可是，也没有多少希望局势复苏的希望。伊拉克的政治就是些混乱不堪的小党派，党派同盟变化无常。2010年选举时，中间派的、世俗倾向的的政党联盟“伊拉克名单”(Iraqiya)实际上比马利基的政党多两票，但奇怪的是，其领导人阿拉维不情愿访问议会，联盟陷入争吵。政治阶层拒绝看起来合理的改革，不再理会尔虞我诈和党派纷争，巩固了马利基的地位，以及其分而治之的决心。
Trouble with the neighbours
与邻之争
Mr Maliki’s efforts to control military appointments, his use of state perks to woo defections from opposition blocs, his abuse of police power and his increasingly brazen appeals to Shia sentiment are all lamentable. Yet these may also be seen as natural responses to the pressures on him. “I’m not sure that anyone else would act much different, and it’s not as if the opposition are offering any alternative,” says a diplomat in Baghdad.
马利基竭力谋求掌控军队任命权，利用国家特权拉拢反对派头程叛变，滥用警力，变得愈发厚颜无耻得迎合什叶派感情。这的确可悲可叹。不过，这也可以看做是马利基深处压力之中的本能反应罢了。巴格达一名外交官员表示：”我不确定其他人会不会有所不同，反对派似乎也不能提供可选方案。”
Western diplomats are often irked by the blind eye Mr Maliki turns to Iranian influence in the country—but they also understand that it is inevitable. The Islamic Republic sponsors several armed and virulently sectarian Shia factions. It also, to the annoyance of Western countries and Sunnis, flies regular cargoes over Iraqi airspace to bolster the flailing Assad regime in Syria. But this does not mean that Iraq is fully under Iranian sway. Very few of Iraq’s Shia leaders subscribe to Iran’s state ideology of velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the jurist. And in increasing its oil exports[做状语，其中的its是指伊拉克] Iraq is clearly pursuing its own interests, not its neighbour’s. The extent to which Iraqi exports have steadied oil prices vexes the cash-strapped and sanctions-crippled regime next door.
马利基对伊朗在伊拉克的影响熟视无睹，这使得西方外交官愤怒不已，不过他们也知道这无可避免。因为伊朗这个伊斯兰共和国支持了不少武装及危险的什叶派宗教团体。使西方国家及逊尼派愤怒的是，伊朗还定期飞越伊拉克上空，向垂死挣扎的叙利亚阿萨德政权提供货物。不过这并不是说伊拉克完全受伊朗影响。几乎没有伊拉克什叶派领导人赞同伊朗的法基赫的监护（velayat-e faqih）国家理念。伊拉克不断提高石油出口量，很明显其要保护本国的利益，而非邻国伊朗的。伊拉克出口在多大程度上稳定了油价，这使得缺乏现金、饱受制裁之困的隔壁烦恼不已。
“We share Iran’s concerns about Syria, but not its strategic interests,” explains Naama Obaidi, a cleric who runs a Najaf think-tank. “And we respect that Iran, which fought a long war with us, and faces big threats, should exert lots of its intelligence effort here.” But while Iraq is willing to accommodate Iran, he says, it will not embrace it fully—unless pushed by fear of its Sunni neighbours.
在纳贾夫运营着一家智库的牧师Naama Obaidi说：”我们赞同伊朗对叙利亚的关切，而非赞同其战略利益。”“伊朗曾与我们交战多年，如今也面临巨大威胁。我们认为伊朗应将其才能发挥在这些地方。”他还表示：“尽管伊拉克愿意接受伊朗，但并不会完全敞开怀抱，除非担心被其逊尼派近邻所逼。”
One of those is Turkey, which has often appeared to consider Iraq’s Shia-dominated government as a catspaw for Iran and acted accordingly. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has repeatedly clashed with Mr Maliki. Iraqi officials contend that their neighbour to the north, which runs a thriving $17 billion trade with Iraq, has promoted both Kurdish and Sunni obstinacy in dealing with Baghdad. A Western official says that it would be hard to exaggerate Turkey’s recklessness.
其中的一个近邻就是土耳其。土耳其常视伊拉克什叶派政府为伊朗的爪牙，并采取相应行动。土耳其总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)常常与马利基总理恶语相向。伊拉克官员很高兴看到，其北方近邻土耳其在库尔德人和逊尼派顽固者与巴格达交往中推动作用。土耳其与伊拉克的贸易也蒸蒸日上，达到了170亿美元。一位西方官员表示很难夸大土耳其的轻率鲁莽。
Mr Maliki will probably serve out the rest of his current term, which ends in April 2014. That is not good news for Iraq, but not entirely bad, either. Just keeping a lid on things, as oil revenues grow and begin to percolate downwards, may be a realistic ambition for a country divided internally and surrounded by strife. Muwafaq al-Rubaie, a former national security adviser of courtly demeanour who displays the noose that hanged Saddam in his heavily guarded villa beside the Tigris, insists that Iraq’s trajectory is generally upwards, not steeply so but recognisably. “Compromise in Arabic is a bad word,” he says, “but reaching it at the eleventh hour is one thing we have learned.”
马利基可能会继续其剩余任期，直到2014年4月。对伊拉克来说，这不是个消息，不过也不是个很坏的消息。随着石油收入增加，并开始流入民间，仅仅控制某些事情，对国内四分五裂、争吵不断的伊拉克来说也许也是一个现实的目标。举止典雅的前国家安全顾问Muwafaq al-Rubaie在底格里斯河旁戒备深严的别墅里展示了绞死萨达姆的绳套，他坚信伊拉克的轨道前进上升的，而非大起大落，很容易辨认。他还说：”妥协在阿拉伯是个糟糕的词汇，但是在最后一刻妥协是我们必须学会的东西。
