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Overloaded overseers: A new paper illuminates the potential and the plight of middle managers
不堪重负的管理者：一篇新论文阐明了中层管理者的潜力和困境
Nothing turns on management theorists more than conflicting incentives. (If the idea of an aroused management theorist has ruined your breakfast, sorry.)
没有什么比相互冲突的激励更能激起管理理论家的兴趣了。(如果想到兴奋的管理理论家让你吃早餐时没了胃口，那么在此说句对不起。)
They ruminate on financial motives—the adverse impact that individual bonus schemes might have on team collaboration, say. They churn out studies and books on the competing interests of shareholders and the executives who act on their behalf.
他们会认真思考财务上的动机，比如个人奖金机制可能会对团队合作产生不利影响。他们发表许多研究和书籍，论述股东和代表股东行事的高管之间的利益冲突。
A new paper, published by Achyuta Adhvaryu of the University of California, San Diego, and Emir Murathanoglu and Anant Nyshadham of the University of Michigan, casts fresh light on the problem.
加州大学圣地亚哥分校的阿曲塔·阿德瓦律以及密歇根大学的埃米尔·木拉塔纳古和阿南特·纳沙德姆发表的一篇新论文，对这个问题提出了新的见解。
It shows that clashing incentives are not always financial, and that conflicts can occur even between different levels of management. In the process it underlines that a much-mocked group deserves to be taken far more seriously.
论文表明，相互冲突的激励并不总是财务上的，而且在不同的管理层之间也可能出现这种冲突。在论述过程中，论文强调，一个备受嘲笑的群体应该得到更严肃的对待。
The authors examined the decisions of middle managers at Shahi Exports, one of India’s largest garment-makers. The firm has about 70 factories, where multiple teams of cutters, sewers and finishers produce clothing.
作者调查了印度最大的服装制造商之一沙希出口公司的中层管理人员的决策。该公司拥有约70家工厂，工厂中有负责裁剪、缝制和整理的多个团队来生产服装。
In their study the academics tracked which team supervisors were being recommended for soft-skills training by their own managers, and then looked at the effect of that training on productivity and retention.
在他们的研究中，学者们跟踪了哪些团队主管被自己的经理推荐，去接受软技能培训，然后考察了培训对工作效率和留任率的影响。
What they found was curious. On average the training worked. Teams whose supervisors had been through the course saw big productivity gains compared with control groups.
他们的发现非常奇特。平均而言，培训奏效了。与对照组相比，那些接受过培训课程的主管，其团队的工作效率有了很大提高。
But these advances were distributed unevenly. Teams whose supervisors were most highly recommended by middle managers for training experienced no productivity gains; the benefits were concentrated on supervisors who were less recommended.
但这些提高的分布并不均匀。那些最受中层经理推荐进行培训的主管，其团队的工作效率没有提升，效率提升的好处集中在那些不太受推荐的主管身上。
The pattern for retention was the reverse: there was a big drop in subsequent quit rates among supervisors who had been highly recommended by their managers, and little change among less recommended ones.
留任模式则与之相反：在经理强烈推荐的主管中，其随后的离职率大幅下降，而在不太受推荐的主管中，离职率几乎没有变化。
Mr Adhvaryu et al look at a variety of explanations for this strange pattern and conclude that it reflects a deliberate calculation: managers were nominating those supervisors whom they regarded as flight risks.
阿德瓦律等人研究了对这种奇怪模式的各种解释，并得出结论，这反映了一种刻意的计算：经理们提名了那些他们认为有离职风险的主管参加培训。
That did not necessarily suit the interests of the company’s senior leaders. But it did suit the interests of middle managers, who bear the burden of filling in for missing supervisors and training new ones.
这并不一定符合该公司高层领导的利益。但这确实符合中层管理人员的利益，他们承担着主管离职后补缺和培训新主管的重担。
Losing workers, in short, makes their lives a lot harder. Retention matters more to them than productivity.
简而言之，失去员工会让他们的日子更难过。对他们来说，留住员工比提高工作效率更重要。
