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Integrity in the financial system
2、金融体系的健全性
Let me now turn to the second dimension of inclusive capitalism that I have chosen to address—integrity in the financial system.
现在来谈一谈包容性资本主义的第二个方面——金融体系的稳健。
In this age of diminished trust, it is the financial sector that takes last place in opinion surveys. This might not be surprising in light of some of the behavior that triggered the global financial crisis. But it is nevertheless disturbing. As many have pointed out, the very word credit derives from the Latin word for trust.
在这个信任度下降的时代，金融部门在观点调查中的得分最低。考虑到触发了全球金融机构的一些行为，这也许并不令人奇怪。但这仍令人烦恼。正如许多人已经指出的，“信用”一词恰恰来自拉丁文的“信任”。
We are all familiar with the factors behind the crisis—a financial sector that nearly collapsed because of excess. A sector that, like Icarus, in its hubris flew too close to the sun, and then fell back to earth—taking the global economy down with it.
我们都了解危机背后的一些因素——金融部门由于发展过度，几乎坍塌。就像伊卡罗斯傲慢地飞向太阳，然后落回到地球——带着全球经济一起下落。
We can trace the problems to the evolution of the financial sector before the crisis. Financial actors were allowed to take excessive risks, leading to a situation whereby the profits on the upside went to the industry—and the losses on the downside were picked up by the public.
我们可以将问题追溯到危机之前金融部门的演变。我们让金融部门冒了太多风险，导致了这样一种状况——经济上行时期的利润被金融行业纳入腰包，而经济下滑时期的损失由公众来承担。
Some of the greatest problems, still outstanding today, lay with the so-called too-big-to-fail firms. In the decade prior to the crisis, the balance sheets of the world’s largest banks increased by two to four-fold. With rising size came rising risk—in the form of lower capital, less stable funding, greater complexity, and more trading.
最严重的一些问题来自所谓的“太大而不能倒”的问题，其至今尚未解决。在危机之前的十年里，世界最大银行的资产负债表扩张了两到四倍。在规模扩大的同时，风险也在上升——体现在资本减少、融资稳定性下降、复杂度上升、交易量增大。
This kind of capitalism was more extractive than inclusive. The size and complexity of the megabanks meant that, in some ways, they could hold policymakers to ransom. The implicit subsidy they derived from being too-big-too-fail came from their ability to borrow more cheaply than smaller banks—magnifying risk and undercutting competition.
这种资本主义在更大程度上是选择性的，而不是包容性的。大型银行的规模和复杂性意味着，政策制定者可能会被它们“绑架”。这些银行因“太大而不能倒”而获得隐性补贴，这是因为它们能够以比小银行更低的成本借款，而这会加剧风险、损害竞争。
Completing the financial reform agenda
完成金融部门议程
Thankfully, the crisis has prompted a major course correction—with the understanding that the true role of the financial sector is to serve, not to rule, the economy. Its real job is to benefit people, especially by financing investment and thus helping with the creation of jobs and growth.
幸好，危机促成了重大的方向调整——这是其于这样一种认识，即金融部门的职能是服务于实体经济，而不是支配实体经济。它的真正作用是为投资提供资金，从而促进创造就业和经济增长，以此造福于人民。
As Winston Churchill once remarked, “I would rather see finance less proud and industry more content”.
正如温斯顿·丘吉尔曾说过的，“我宁可看到金融位谦而产业位尊”。
The good news is that the international community has made progress on the reform agenda. This is especially true for banking regulation under the auspices of the Basel Committee, where we are moving forward with stronger capital and liquidity requirements. This should make the system safer, sounder, and more service oriented.
好消息是，国际社会在改革议程上已经取得一定进展。巴塞尔委员会领导下的银行监管改革尤其如此，资本和流动性要求正在增强。这会使金融体系更加安全、更加稳健、更加以服务为导向。
The bad news is that progress is still too slow, and the finish line is still too far off. Some of this arises from the sheer complexity of the task at hand. Yet, we must acknowledge that it also stems from fierce industry pushback, and from the fatigue that is bound to set in at this point in a long race.
坏消息是，进展仍然太慢，我们距离终点线还是太远。这在一定程度上是因为这项任务非常复杂。但我们必须承认这也是因为我们面临巨大的行业阻力，并且在漫长的过程中已经产生疲劳情绪。
A big gap is that the too-big-to-fail problem has not yet been solved. A recent study by IMF staff shows that these banks are still major sources of systemic risk. Their implicit subsidy is still going strongly—amounting to about $70 billion in the US, and up to $300 billion in the Euro Area.
一个重要缺口是，“太大而不能倒”问题尚未得到解决。基金组织工作人员最近开展的一项研究显示，这些银行仍是系统性风险的重要来源。它们的隐性补贴依然很高——在美国约为 700亿美元，在欧元区高达 3000亿美元。
So clearly, ending too-big-to-fail must be a priority. That means tougher regulation and tighter supervision.
所以，解决“太大而不能倒”问题显然是一个优先任务。这意味着需要实行更严格的监管。
Here, I believe that the new capital surcharges for systemic banks can work. We estimated that increasing the capital ratio on these banks by 2? percent, beyond the Basel III standard, can reduce the systemic risk of a trillion dollar bank by a quarter. This is a big deal.
在这方面，我认为，新的针对系统性银行的资本附加要求能够发挥作用。我们估计，在巴塞尔 III标准的基础上，将对这些银行的资本比率要求进一步提高 2.5个百分点，能够使规模达到万亿美元的银行的系统性风险下降四分之一。这种改善相当显著。
Yet the problem will not go away without steps to reduce the potential for contagion. First on the agenda should be an agreement on cross-border resolution of megabanks—providing a framework to unwind them in an orderly way in case of failure. This is a gaping hole in the financial architecture right now, and it calls for countries to put the global good of financial stability ahead of their parochial concerns.
不过，如果不采取步骤降低发生波及效应的可能性，问题还是得不到解决。首先应就大型银行的跨境破产处置达成一致——提供一个框架，在这些银行经营失败时，能够有序地关闭它们。这个问题是目前金融架构中的一个重要漏洞，在这方面，各国应将全球金融稳定目标置于本国考虑因素之上。
And we should not give up just because it is hard. Let me quote John Fitzgerald Kennedy here, who famously said that “we choose to go to the moon not because it is easy, but because it is hard”.
我们不应仅仅因为难而放弃。我想引用约翰·肯尼迪说过的一句著名的话：“我们想登上月球，不是因为这很容易，而且因为这很难。”
We also need more vigor across the rest of the reform agenda—better rules for nonbanks, better monitoring of shadow banks, and better safety and transparency over derivatives, an area that is still today excessively obscure and complex. To reduce the scope for contagion, I would like to see much more progress on cross-border issues, for example, in the mutual recognition of rules for derivatives markets.
我们也需更有力地推进其他改革——改善针对非银行机构的规则，对影子银行进行更好的监控，提高衍生产品的安全性和透明度（这一领域目前仍然过于模糊和复杂）。同样，为了降低产生波及效应的可能性，跨境问题需要取得更多进展，例如，共同确定衍生产品市场的规则。
Again, this is complex, and we need to be mindful of the risks of fragmenting the global financial system and hampering the flow of credit to finance investment. But complexity is not an excuse for complacency and delay.
同样，这很复杂，我们需要考虑到分割全球金融体系以及阻碍投资信贷流动的风险。但不能因为这个问题复杂，就安于现状和拖延不前。
