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Business
商业
Dual-class share structures
双重股份结构
The cost of control
控制的成本
The trouble with non-voting shares
没有表决权的股票带来的麻烦
SHAREHOLDERS in News Corporation have only themselves to blame.
新闻集团的股东只能怪他们自己。
When they entrusted Rupert Murdoch with their money, they knew he would not let them tell him what to do with it.
当初他们信任鲁伯特·默多克，把自己的钱交给他时并没指望默多克会按照他们的意愿投资。
The Murdoch family owns about 12% of the company but controls almost 40% of the votes, through a special class of shares which have superior voting rights.
默多克家族拥有公司12％的股份，不过通过一个特设的控股阶层—该阶层有优先投票权—掌控着40％的选票。
Such dual-class share structures are quite common, especially at media firms.
如此这般的双重阶级”股份结构很普遍，尤其是在多媒体行业。
They can shield managers from stockmarket short-termism and hostile takeovers. But they cause problems, too.
这样经理人能避开短期证券交易和不怀好意的接管，但问题也是有的。
Two studies of American firms by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, covering the years from 1994 to 2002, found that dual-class firms perform worse than comparable firms where all shares confer equal voting rights.
1994年到2002年，从Paul Gompers，Joy Ishii 和 Andrew Metrick主持的两个关于美国公司的研究发现双重结构的公司比那些实行平等投票的企业，表现要糟糕。
Dual-class firms are fonder of debt than equity, to prevent the dilution of controlling stakes.
双重阶级公司比起普通股更热衷债权，以防止所控股被削弱。
Yet surprisingly, their shares do not trade at a big discount on stockmarkets.
但让人惊讶的是，他们的股票并未在证券市场受到贱价售卖的待遇。
A study by Chad Zutter and Scott Smart found that dual-class initial public offerings achieved only slightly lower price-earnings and price-sales ratios than comparable single-class IPOs.
由Chad Zutter和Scott Smart所做的一项调查发现，双阶级公司首次公开发售的股份，比起单阶级公司，本益比和营收比只稍微低了一点点。
Nor does this strange ownership model show any sign of going out of fashion.
这种陌生的所有权形式也没显露出任何过时的信号。
There were 12 dual-class IPOs in America last year, not far from the norm for the nine-year period in the 1990s studied by Mr Zutter and Mr Smart.
根据Zutter 先生和 Smart先生的调查，去年在美国首次公开发行股票的公司里有12家是双级公司，与90年代的九年阶段标准差不多。
Dual-class structures are not just a way for press barons to keep their hands on the hatchet with which they threaten governments.
双阶级结构不仅是报业巨头依之拿捏政府的厉斧。
Internet firms love them, too, since they allow founders brimming with self-belief to raise cash without surrendering control.
因特网公司也爱他们，因为这种形式能使公司的创始人放手集资而不必顾及周遭的控制。
Google's IPO in 2004 involved two classes of share.
谷歌2004年首次公开发行股票是有两级股票，
LinkedIn followed suit this year.
今年LinkedIn也随之仿效。
The IPO filings of Zynga and Groupon would also grant managers control over voting rights.
而Zynga和Groupon首次公开发行股票的文件也给予了经理人大于控制投票权的权力。
Investors who seek long-term gains may be happy to cede control if they think the boss is a genius.
如果觉得那个企业的老板是个天才，那些追求长期盈利的投资者也许乐意放弃控制权。
It worked for the holders of B shares in Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway.
手握Berkshire HathawayB型股票的投资者就是，该公司老板是Warren Buffett。
It once worked for investors in Mr Murdoch, too.
曾经默多克先生的投资者也是，
But tech punters have not been so lucky.
不过那些看好技术的就没这么好运了。
The number of dual-class firms listed in America fell from 482 in 2000 to 362 in 2002 as the dotcom bubble burst.
网络泡沫的破灭使美国的双级公司数量从2000年的482家减到了2002年的362家。
If the current internet boom follows a similar path, News Corporation shareholders will not be the only ones feeling second-class.
如果现今兴旺的因特网产业也是如此，那么新闻集团的股东将不会是唯一感到被看成二流的人。
