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The larger budget deficits entailed by tax reform, along with more public spending on infrastructure, would underpin yields on long-term Treasury bonds.
因税收改革而造成的更大的预算赤字，连同更多的基础设施公共开支一起，会支撑起长期国债的收益。
Indeed, after falling in the initial aftermath of Mr Trump's victory, yields on 10- and 30-year Treasuries are on the rise again.
实际上，在特朗普获胜后的最初下跌过后，10年期和30年期的国债收益再启升势。
Add the potential for higher inflation from the stimulus and the likelier use of some protectionist tariffs, plus a Federal Reserve with a more hawkish tilt, as Mr Trump's appointees alter the complexion of its interest-rate-setting committee, and you have the makings of a renewed dollar rally.
算上来自刺激的更高通胀的可能性以及某些保护主义关税的可能的运用，以及因为特朗普的任命对其议息委员会局面的改变而造成的一个更具鹰派倾向的美联储，新一轮美元牛市形成的各种条件就全都具备了。
A fiscal stimulus coupled with an investment splurge in the world's largest economy should, all else equal, also be good for global aggregate demand.
在其他条件都相等的情况下，伴随着投资猛增的世界第二大经济体的财政刺激也应该有利于全球总需求。
And if this kind of “reflation populism” improves the near-term prospects for America's economy, it may dissuade Mr Trump from resorting to full-strength “anti-trade populism”. Well, perhaps.
同时，倘若这种“再通胀民粹主义”能让美国经济的近期前景有所改善，就有可能阻止特朗普诉诸倾尽全力的“反贸易民粹主义”。或许吧。
But given his leanings, it is easy to imagine him resorting to soft protectionism that keeps much of the additional demand within America's borders.
但是，考虑到他的倾向，特朗普诉诸于将大部分额外需求留在美国国内的软性保护主义是很容易就能想到的。
He might for instance lean on companies to favour domestic suppliers, or attach local-content conditions to publicly funded infrastructure projects.
例如，他可能依靠公司去眷顾国内供应商，或者是把本地内容条件附加给公共资助的基础设施项目。
What is more, the repatriation of profits by American firms would draw resources away from their subsidiaries abroad.
更为重要的是，美国企业的利润回流会将各种资源抽离它们的海外分公司。
In 1971 the world feared dollar weakness.
1971年，世界对美元的弱势忧心忡忡。
These days, dollar strength tends to have a tightening effect on global financial conditions.
如今，美元的强势往往会给全球金融环境造成一种收紧效应。
The waxing and waning of the dollar is strongly linked to the ups and downs of the credit cycle.
美元的涨跌已经与信贷周期的起伏紧密地联系在一起。
When the dollar is weak and American interest rates are low, companies outside America are keen to borrow dollars.
当美元疲软、美国利率处于低位时，美国之外的公司热衷于借入美元。
Often big firms, flush with such cheap loans, will further extend credit in local currencies to smaller ones.
这类廉价贷款充裕的大公司经常会进一步将用当地货币计算的信贷扩展至较小的公司。
But when the dollar goes up, the cycle goes into reverse, as corporate borrowers outside America scramble to pay down their dollar debts.
但是，当美元上涨时，由于美国之外的企业举债者急于偿还美元债务，信贷周期反转。
That causes a more general tightening of credit.
造成一种更加整体的信贷收紧。
Mexico has the most to lose from Mr Trump's presidency, should he keep his campaign promises.
如果特朗普信守竞选承诺，墨西哥将是他总统任期的最大输家。
So the peso plummeted in the wake of the result.
因而，墨西哥比索在结果出来后大幅跳水。
But Mexico, along with Chile, Turkey, the Philippines and Russia, also has a large burden of dollar debts, which are becoming more expensive in local currency.
但是，墨西哥，与智利、土耳其、菲律宾和俄罗斯一起，也背负着沉重的美元债务。这些债务，用当地货币来计算的话，正在变得越来越昂贵。
Mr Trump's protectionist bent may make it hard for emerging markets to trade their way out of trouble.
特朗普的保护主义倾向可能让新兴市场很难走出困境。
Only a few are likely to be unharmed by his victory.
只有少数几个国家可能不受他的胜利的危害。
Where does a Trump victory leave China, the world's second-largest economy?
特朗普的胜利会把世界第二大经济体中国置于何种境地呢？
China accounts for roughly a half of America's net trade-deficit, so in Mr Trump's zero-sum reckoning, it has a lot to lose should America launch an all-out trade war.
中国大约占美国贸易净赤字的一半，因此，在特朗普的零和思维中，如果发起一场贸易战，美国将损失惨重。
In fact, the resulting disruption to global supply-chains would badly hurt American firms, and higher prices on imported goods would squeeze American consumers, especially poorer households, which spend proportionately more on them.
实际上，由此而导致的对于全球供应链的破坏会严重伤害美国企业，同时越来越高的进口商品价格也
