Finance and economics
财经版块
Putin’s problem
普京的问题
What does the rouble’s collapse mean for Russia’s ability to wage war?
卢布暴跌对俄罗斯发动战争的能力意味着什么?
On August 14th Russia’s rouble slipped past the value of 100 to the American dollar, meaning it was worth less than a solitary cent—and was the cheapest it had been since the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine.
8月14日,俄罗斯卢布汇率跌破了1美元兑100卢布的水平,这意味着卢布的价值还不到1美分,也是俄乌战争爆发后的最低水平。
The currency is one of the world’s worst performers this year, outdone only by perennially troublesome peers like the Argentine peso, Venezuelan bolivar and Turkish lira.
卢布是今年全球表现最差的货币之一,仅次于阿根廷比索、委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔和土耳其里拉等长期深陷麻烦的货币。
The next day Russian monetary policymakers intervened, scrambling to respond to events for the first time since early in the war.
第二天,俄罗斯货币政策制定者出手干预,自战争之初以来首次争先恐后地对事件做出回应。
The Bank of Russia raised interest rates by 3.5 percentage points, to 12%.
俄罗斯央行将利率上调3.5个百分点,至12%。
Although the rouble rose a little on the news, it is still, at 96 to the dollar, far cheaper than its level of 60 or so this time last year.
尽管卢布在这一消息传出后略有上涨,但目前1美元兑96卢布的汇率仍远低于去年这个时候1美元兑60卢布的水平。
Rate rises are unlikely to stem the currency’s decline soon, with consequences for Vladimir Putin’s ability to wage war.
加息不太可能很快阻止卢布的下跌,这将影响弗拉基米尔·普京发动战争的能力。
Currency collapses are often prompted by nervous international investors or fleeing domestic capital.
货币崩盘往往是由紧张的国际投资者或国内资本外逃引发的。
Yet trading in the rouble, especially against the dollar, remains thin.
然而,卢布的交易,尤其是对美元的交易,仍然不多。
Sanctions and capital controls have left Russia isolated.
制裁和资本管制让俄罗斯变得孤立。
Instead of reflecting the aggregated opinions of speculators, the rouble swings according to the textbook economic model, reflecting the relative strength of exports (which earn foreign currency) and imports (which must be paid for with these earnings).
卢布没有反映出投机者的总体态度,而是按照教科书上的经济模型进行波动,反映了出口(赚取外汇)和进口(必须用这些外汇支付)的相对强弱。
Since the G7 imposed a $60 price cap on Russian oil in December, the value of exports has slumped.
自去年12月七国集团对俄罗斯石油实施60美元的价格上限以来,俄罗斯的出口额大幅下降。
Russia’s earnings were 15% lower in dollar terms from January to July than during the same period last year, a fact not entirely explained by a lower global oil price.
以美元计算,俄罗斯今年1月至7月的收入比去年同期下降了15%,这一事实并不能完全用全球油价下跌来解释。
Meanwhile, imports have surged as the government prosecutes its war, and buys the goods to do so.
与此同时,随着政府继续进行战争,并为此购买商品,进口额激增。
In the first seven months of the year Russia’s current-account surplus, a measure of how much more foreign currency the country receives than spends, fell by 86%, to $25bn.
今年前七个月,俄罗斯的经常账户盈余下降了86%,降至250亿美元。经常账户盈余是衡量一国外汇收入超过支出多少的一个指标。
On the one hand, this suggests the oil-price cap is having some impact.
一方面,这表明石油价格上限在产生一些影响。
Attempts to dodge the policy are not making up for being forced to sell oil at a discount.
试图规避这一政策并不能弥补被迫折价出售石油带来的损失。
On the other hand, it suggests Russia is finding ways to import goods.
另一方面,这表明俄罗斯正在寻找进口商品的方法。
German exports to Russia’s friendlier neighbours, for instance, have shot up suspiciously.
例如,德国对俄罗斯更友好的邻国的出口额出现了蹊跷的大幅增长。
A cheap currency raises the rouble value of the government’s oil revenues, but it also raises the cost of the imports.
廉价货币提高了政府出口石油收入的卢布价值,但也提高了进口成本。
In June Andrei Belousov, Russia’s deputy prime minister, said the value at the time, of 80-90 roubles a dollar, was best for the country.
6月,俄罗斯副总理安德烈·别洛乌索夫表示,当时1美元兑80-90卢布的汇率对俄罗斯来说是最好的。
When the rouble was far stronger last year, the Russian government was happy to use it as evidence Western sanctions were failing.
去年卢布走强时,俄罗斯政府欣然将其作为西方制裁失败的证据。
That confidence has now gone.
这种信心现在已经消失了。
On August 14th Maxim Oreshkin, an adviser to Mr Putin, wrote a column stressing the need for a strong rouble and blaming its collapse on the central bank.
8月14日,普京的顾问马克西姆·奥雷什金写了一篇专栏文章,强调卢布走强的必要性,并将卢布的崩溃归咎于中央银行。
The emergency rate rise helped the rouble only a little.
紧急加息对卢布的帮助微乎其微。
Russia’s isolation means higher interest rates are unlikely to tempt “hot money” (speculative funds seeking short-term returns).
俄罗斯的孤立地位意味着,较高的利率不太可能吸引“热钱”(寻求短期回报的投机性资金)。
The focus may now turn to the domestic capital that is at risk of fleeing.
焦点现在可能转向有外逃风险的国内资本。
Strengthening capital controls could stanch the flow, but would take time to have an impact.
加强资本管制可能会遏制资本流动,但需要时间才能产生效果。
As this piece was published, the government was reportedly due to meet to decide whether to force exporters to sell foreign-currency earnings.
本文发表时,据报道,俄罗斯政府将召开会议,决定是否强制出口商出售外汇收入。
Direct intervention in currency markets is another option.
直接干预外汇市场是另一种选择。
The central bank has scaled back purchases of foreign currency.
央行已经缩减了外币购买量。
Under a budgetary rule, Russia used to buy other currencies in exchange for roubles if it had a surplus of oil and gas revenue, in order to build up reserves.
根据一项预算规定,俄罗斯过去如果有石油和天然气收入盈余,就会购买其他货币来换取卢布,以建立储备。
On August 9th this rule was abandoned.
8月9日,这一规定被废除。
According to official figures, the country had foreign-currency reserves of $587bn at the start of August, suggesting the central bank has the firepower to prop up the rouble.
官方数据显示,截至8月初,俄罗斯拥有5870亿美元的外汇储备,这表明俄罗斯央行拥有支撑卢布的足够火力。
The problem is that some $300bn of these reserves are frozen by the West.
问题是,其中约3000亿美元的外汇储备已被西方冻结。
Unless the government can secure more oil revenue, it faces a choice.
除非俄罗斯政府能从石油获得更多的外汇收入,否则它将面临一个选择。
The state could cut back on spending, including on its armed forces, in order to reduce imports.
国家可以削减开支,包括军队开支,以减少进口。
Alternatively, the civilian economy will take the pain.
或者让民间经济承担痛苦。
Rising inflation and higher interest rates will weaken the purchasing power of ordinary Russians, forcing them to buy fewer foreign goods.
不断上升的通胀和更高的利率将削弱普通俄罗斯人的购买力,迫使他们减少购买外国商品。
Thus the fate of Russia’s economy will not be decided by the judgments of international financiers but by the depths of Mr Putin’s aggression.
因此俄罗斯经济的命运将不会由国际金融家的判断决定,而将由普京的战争强度决定。
It is a far more unhappy situation in which to be trapped.
这是一种更加令人不快的困境。