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The latest wave of anti-trust investigations in China – first Qualcomm and now Microsoft and the ongoing criminal investigations involving GSK – is having an unsettling effect on global supply chains across a variety of industry sectors.
先是高通(Qualcomm)，现在又是微软(Microsoft)，还有正在接受刑事调查的葛兰素史克(GSK)，中国的新一轮反垄断调查正对跨多种行业的全球供应链造成令人不安的影响。
But instead of planning an exodus, Western businesses should avoid over reacting and focus on finding new, appropriate strategies that will allow them to stay and profit from doing business in the world’s fastest-growing consumer market.
但西方企业该做的不是计划大规模撤离，而是避免过度反应，并专注于寻找新的、适当的战略，让自己留在这个全球增长最快的消费市场继续做生意赚钱。
Of course, any business thinking about shifting operations to China in order to gain access to its developing marketplace should do so with its eyes fully open. Businesses that go there simply seeking to profit from their exposure to the market will be unlikely to find that things run smoothly.
当然，任何正考虑将业务迁往中国，以求进入其发展中市场的企业都应睁大双眼。来华外企如果只想获利于其对中国市场的敞口，往往会发现事情不顺利。
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the agency responsible for administrative control of the Chinese economy, will be more inclined to spot corrupt or anti-competitive working practices in businesses that are only interested in profiting from China rather than those that are bringing something valuable to the country that will enable its economy to grow in the future.
负责对中国经济实施行政控制的机构——国家发展和改革委员会(NDRC)，更倾向于在以下这类公司发现腐败或反竞争行为：只关心从中国获利，而不为这个国家带来有价值的东西以推动其未来经济增长。
Simply put, if China doesn’t feel it is learning from a business, or a business is just exploiting an advantage it has, it will gently or abruptly stop it (for example with import tariffs or corruption investigations, or more subtly with changes to joint venture ownerships, ease of doing business, or taxation).
简言之，如果某家企业让中国感到没有可借鉴之处，或只是在利用自己的优势地位，那么中国就会要么柔和要么突然地向它亮红灯。比如上调进口关税，进行反腐败调查，或采取更微妙的手段，如调整合资企业所有权，加大做生意的难度，或采取税务手段。
Businesses that are providing Chinese people with an opportunity to learn how to manufacture premium parts for the automotive or aerospace industries, for example, or gain knowledge of innovative technologies, will be more welcome and accommodated.
那些能为中方提供学习借鉴机会的企业，将更受中国欢迎和接纳，比如让中国人学会如何制造汽车或航空航天高端零部件，或掌握创新科技知识。
Once this degree of market control is understood, Western businesses will realise that any business opportunity in China comes with strings and a time window attached – it may last five or ten years, or possibly longer, but it will be finite without evolution. If businesses become too big, they tend to be brought firmly under state control, or managed so as not to get too powerful or influential.
一旦西方企业了解到这种市场控制的分寸，它们将认识到在华的任何商机都带有附加条件和时间窗，它的时长可能是5年、10年，或更久，但如果业务没有演变，这个时长肯定是有限的。如果企业发展得过于庞大，国家往往会把它们牢牢控制起来，或设法阻止它们变得过于强大或有影响力。
From an outsider’s viewpoint, it may seem that Western companies have become less welcome in China lately, but this has never been further from the truth. The Chinese Government is desperate for its industries to move up the value chain so they can pay higher salaries and give Chinese people the job prospects and increased buying power they demand. They need Western businesses to help them to achieve this and scaring companies away is definitely not what they want.
从外界角度来看，西方企业貌似最近在华正逐渐遇冷，但这种想法完全错了。中国政府急于让国内产业向价值链上方移动，从而为中国人民提供更高的薪水、更多的就业机会以及他们要求的更大的购买力。中国需要西方企业帮忙实现这一目标，吓跑企业绝对不是他们的初衷。
Despite this, the NDRC’s latest swoop on Western businesses could seem arbitrary (even though it’s not) and it is certainly politically motivated. However, we should realise that Western approaches to inbound trading are not that dissimilar. In Europe and the US, governments would probably seek to slap a tariff on any goods entering the marketplace if they faced little or no domestic competition (duties can also be added on to protect local competition). Is the NDRC’s action really that different?
尽管如此，国家发改委对西方企业的新一轮举动可能貌似武断（尽管其实并非如此），而且肯定出于政治动机。但我们应该认识到，西方对外来贸易的处理与中国并没那么大不同。在欧美等国，如果进入本国市场的商品很少或没有遇到国内竞争，政府多半会对该商品强加关税（或者为保护本土竞争力而开征关税）。中国发改委的作法真的有很大不同吗？
While pulling out of China would be an over-reaction, some Western companies that are already operating there or those thinking about entering the marketplace, may need to find new strategies to minimise the associated risks.
尽管撤出中国将是过度反应，但某些已经在中国运营的西方企业，或者那些想要进入中国市场的企业，或许需要找到新策略以最大限度地降低风险。
A business will not be successful unless it recognises the need to provide a service in educating the local market, and is happy in doing so, in addition to selling its product or technology. By going in to business with a local partner, a planned strategy is put in place. The local partner will usually receive significant capital or taxation incentives, on top of the benefit gained by working with and learning from an incoming company.
除非一个企业意识到，在销售其产品或者技术的同时，它需要提供教育当地市场的服务，并且乐于这么做，否则其无法取得成功。与当地的伙伴企业合作开展经营，有助于落实一种有计划的策略。当地伙伴在受益于与外企合作并向其学习的同时，通常还能得到可观的资本或者税收激励。
That said, a decent window of opportunity in a large market as well as working with a partner who the government is supporting and intending to make successful, can deliver a compelling business case and unique competitive advantage.
话说回来，在一个庞大的市场得到一扇不错的机遇之窗，加上与政府大力支持并乐见其成功的合作伙伴合作，有望构成一个令人信服的商业理由，具有独特的竞争优势。
They should start by making sure their own corruption and anti-bribery policies are robust and, where necessary, to make sure that local expertise is employed to guide them on the correct protocols. In this way, businesses will be doing what they can to manage their risks from the start. If they later find themselves the focus of an anti-trust probe, the worst they could be accused of would be ‘monopolistic pricing’, which from a rest-of-the-world perspective at least, would be less an indication of corruption and more of a company that was the victim of its own success.
企业首先应该确保自身的腐败和反贿赂政策是完善的，在有必要的时候，还要确保运用本地专业知识，指引公司遵守正确的准则。通过这种方式，企业可以尽其所能，从一开始就管理好自己的风险。如果之后这些企业发现自己成为反垄断调查的目标，最坏的情况也只是被指控“垄断定价”。至少从世界其他地方的视角来看，这种指控在更大程度上意味着该企业是自身成功的受害者，而不是表明其卷入了腐败案。
Another way to minimise risk would be to avoid over exposure to the marketplace in the first place. As tempting as it may seem given the size of the Chinese marketplace, rather than going full throttle to maximise sales there, it may be sensible to spread risk and seek entry to some other fast-developing Asian countries at the same time – and there are plenty to go for.
另一个将风险降至最低的方法是在一开始就避免对市场建立过大的敞口。考虑到中国市场的规模，全力投入似乎颇具诱惑性。然而，与其全力提高在中国的销售额，明智的选择或许是分散风险，寻求进入其他快速发展的亚洲国家，而且可供选择的国家有很多。
It may also be possible to hedge against the risk of facing an anti-trust investigation by making sure your business interests in the country are firmly tied up in a joint venture, which is in fact a statutory requirement. This will ensure that Chinese people can learn from the services and knowledge you are bringing with you and can develop this commercially in the future.
对冲反垄断调查的风险还有另一个可能方案，就是确保企业在中国的商业利益捆绑在一个合资企业中，事实上这也是法定要求。这会确保中国人能从你带来的服务和知识中学习，并在今后将其应用于商业化发展。
Finally, when it comes to reputational risk, businesses should take a balanced view. It would be easy to let such risks make their decision-making too risk averse, particularly when they see the headlines that anti-trust probes in China generate. It is important to remember that the rest of the world understands that China is a strictly-controlled marketplace and will remain that way.
最后，对于声誉风险，企业应持一种平衡的观点。很容易让这种风险导致企业在决策时过于惧怕风险，特别是当企业看到中国反垄断调查的新闻头条时。记住以下这点很重要：世界其他地方的人理解中国是一个严格受控的市场，而且这种状况将持续下去。
Roy Williams is managing director at Vendigital, a firm of procurement and supply chain specialists, operating globally and across industry sectors. As part of its international footprint, the company has a base in Hong Kong.
罗伊•威廉姆斯是咨询公司Vendigital的总经理。该公司由采购和供应链领域的专业人士组成，在全球范围内运营，提供多种行业类别的服务。作为全球部署的一部分，公司在香港设有办公室。
