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The high-strength carbon fibre made by Japan’s Toray Industries is eagerly sought after by the makers of racing bikes and jet aircraft. It also happens to be perfect for supersonic centrifuges used to enrich the uranium in nuclear bombs.
日本东丽工业株式会社(Toray Industries)生产的高强度碳纤维深受竞赛自行车和喷气式飞机制造商喜爱，它们碰巧又是制造超声离心机的绝佳材料，而超声离心机被用于浓缩制造核弹所需的铀。
For that reason, trade in the company’s high-strength T700 filament is carefully controlled by almost a dozen international bodies. To buy it directly from Tokyo-based Toray requires an export licence from Japan’s Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry and a two-page end-user certificate.
为此，东丽高强度T700碳纤维的买卖受到十余家国际机构的严格管制。要从这家东京公司直接采购这种碳纤维，需要有日本经产省(METI)下发的出口许可证以及两页长的最终用户证明。
But for those who do not want the hassle, there is another place to find suppliers which will not ask so many questions: Alibaba.com, the Chinese trade website owned by Alibaba Group, which listed in the US last week in the third-biggest initial public offering in history.
如果不想这么麻烦，还有一个地方可以找到没有这么多要求的供应商：阿里巴巴集团(Alibaba Group)旗下的Alibaba.com网站。阿里巴巴集团近日刚在美国上市，为史上第三大首次公开招股(IPO)。
“Alibaba is a virtual supermarket for proliferation-sensitive items used in the process of producing nuclear weapons,” says Nick Gillard, a researcher at Project Alpha, a non-proliferation research centre at King’s College in London. High-strength aluminium, maraging steel rods (used to make centrifuge rotors), advanced vacuum pumps and gauges used in the enrichment process are all for sale on the site. “Virtually every dual-use item needed for a proliferator to produce nuclear weapons is advertised for sale on Alibaba.”
伦敦大学国王学院(King's College)防核扩散研究中心Project Alpha的研究员尼克•吉拉德(Nick Gillard)表示：“阿里巴巴好比一个核扩散敏感物品的虚拟超市，这些东西可用在生产核武器的过程中。”高强度铝合金、马氏体时效钢（可用于生产离心机转子）、高级真空泵以及浓缩过程中会用到的量规都可以通过该网站买到。“核扩散者生产核武器所需的几乎所有军民两用物品都可以在阿里巴巴网站上找到。”
These items all have civilian uses as well, which makes their regulation complicated. These and dozens of other categories of “dual-use” goods are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group whose 48 members, including China, pledge to enforce export licences and end-user certificates detailing their ultimate destination, along with a commitment not to re-export or transfer ownership. Dual-use goods are also specifically prohibited for export to Iran by a long line of UN Security Council resolutions.
这些商品都可作为民用，因此监管起来就更加困难。以上商品——还有另外几十种军民两用商品——受到核供应国集团(NSG)的管制。核供应国集团由包括中国在内的48个国家组成，承诺实行出口许可和最终用户证明制度，要求证书上列明商品最终目的地，并保证不会将商品转出口或转让。联合国安理会(UN Security Council)的多项决议也明令禁止向伊朗出口军民两用商品。
But China has become a hub for illicit nuclear procurement, according to Mr Gillard and other authorities on non-proliferation. This is partly due to the vast size of its manufacturing industry, they say, and because of what one western diplomat calls a “flexible” attitude towards regulation of the trade.
然而，吉拉德还有其他核不扩散方面的权威人士都说，中国已成为一个非法核采购中心。他们指出，中国制造业极其庞大是造成这种局面的一部分原因。还有一个原因在于一名西方外交官所说的中国在相关交易监管上的“灵活”态度。
A report by the UN Iran Sanctions Committee panel of experts in June gave details of 30 recent interdictions in various countries of finished goods and raw materials bound for Iran or involving individuals known to be involved in the illicit trade of nuclear materials. Of those, 20 were of goods shipped from or originating in China, including high-strength aluminium, ovens, steel bellows, batteries and other items that could be used in Iran’s “prohibited activities”, according to the report.
联合国制裁伊朗委员会(UN Iran Sanctions Committee)的专家们在6月发布了一份报告，详细列出了近期在多个国家实施的30项禁令，这些禁令或者禁止将相关成品和原材料运往伊朗，或者涉及已知参与了非法核材料交易的个人。其中20项禁令涉及从中国发货或原产于中国的商品，包括高强度铝合金、干燥炉、不锈钢波纹管、电池及其他可能被用于伊朗“被禁止的活动”的物品。
Most of these items are for sale on Alibaba.com, which functions as a global Yellow Pages for wholesale manufactures, and also listed on 1688.com, a Chinese version of the English site used for domestic business-to-business trade.
这些物品大多在Alibaba.com和1688.com都有销售，Alibaba.com是批发制造品的全球黄页，1688.com则是该英文网站的中文版，专注于国内b2b交易。
Alibaba is better known for its retail ecommerce websites Taobao and Tmall, but the business-to-business sites are also successful. In total Alibaba’s domestic platforms accounted for sales of almost $300bn in merchandise by Alibaba’s third-party sellers in the 12 months to June 30 – more than Amazon and Ebay combined. These huge sales numbers, which increased 63 per cent last year, explain why western investors are clamouring for the company’s shares.
阿里巴巴旗下最有名的是电子商务零售网站淘宝(Taobao)和天猫(Tmall)，不过其b2b网站也十分成功。在截至6月30日的12个月内，阿里巴巴第三方销售商通过阿里巴巴国内平台总共销售了价值近3000亿美元的商品，比亚马逊(Amazon)和Ebay的总和都多。这样巨大的销售额——较上年增长了63%——解释了西方投资者为何对阿里巴巴股票趋之若鹜。
Analysts say Alibaba has done nothing illegal, noting that the availability of sensitive merchandise on its sites is similar to other third-party issues faced by internet companies, from pirated music on Google to drug precursors on eBay. The fact that dual-use items have legitimate applications makes policing difficult, especially when the problems appear to lie with lax regulatory enforcement by Chinese authorities.
分析师表示，阿里巴巴的行为并无违法之处。他们指出，该公司网站上的敏感商品问题与其他互联网企业存在的第三方问题类似，比如谷歌(Google)的盗版音乐问题，以及eBay上的易制毒化学品问题。军民两用物品具有合法民用用途的事实，令这类物品的管控十分困难。而在中国，由于相关主管部门在强制执法方面缺乏力度，问题尤为突出。
“Alibaba.com is an open, user-generated-content platform which strongly supports and abides by all international laws and rules related to non-proliferation” the company said in a statement. “Alibaba.com has robust product listing policies in place and will co-operate with law enforcement authorities worldwide to remove problematic product listings promptly upon receipt of notice.”
阿里巴巴在一份声明中表示：“Alibaba.com是一个开放的、由用户生成内容的平台，该网站强烈支持并遵守国际上一切有关核不扩散的法律法规”。“Alibaba.com拥有健全的产品上架制度，愿意与世界各地执法机关合作，一收到通知就会移除问题产品信息。”
With its listing in the US last week, which raised $25bn, Alibaba became the second-largest web company in the world by market capitalisation, behind Google. This places it under US regulatory authority, which may mean it has to get tougher on a range of problems, from the availability of knock-off gifts or electronics to nuclear-sensitive materials.
阿里巴巴近日在美国上市并融资250亿美元，按市值计算，其已成为全球第二大互联网企业，仅次于谷歌。上市后的阿里巴巴要接受美国监管机构的监督。这可能意味着阿里巴巴必须对其网站上存在的众多问题商品——从仿冒礼品、盗版电子产品到核敏感材料——采取更加严厉的处理办法。
“Having this type of interaction possible online clearly does make proliferation easier,” says Matthew Godsey, a researcher at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. “It makes it quicker for someone attempting to procure an item for a weapons programme to find someone able to supply it who either doesn’t know or doesn’t care what it will be used for.”
威斯康星核武管制研究项目(Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control)研究员马修•戈德西(Matthew Godsey)表示：“在网上能够进行这种互动显然让核扩散变得更为容易。通过网络，想为某个武器项目采购材料的人可以很便捷地找到能提供该物品的人，而后者不知道或者不关心买家采购该物品的用途。”
Uncontrolled Chinese exports of carbon fibre gained attention after the revelation that a shipment of 7,600kg of Toray T700 carbon filament was seized by Singapore customs officials en route from China to Iran in December 2012. The seizure was revealed this summer in a UN report.
今年夏季联合国发布的一份报告披露，2012年12月，一批总重7600公斤的东丽T700碳纤维在从中国运往伊朗的途中被新加坡海关截获。碳纤维在未受管制情况下从中国流出的问题由此引起了公众注意。
The shipment contained carbon fibre in sufficient quantities to make centrifuges for a nuclear enrichment facility the size of Fordow , according to a study by Project Alpha .
Project Alpha的研究表明，这批碳纤维的数量足够为一座像福尔多(Fordow)一样大的核浓缩设施制造所需的离心机。
Toray said it was aiding the UN investigation and could not discuss the details of the case, and declined to name the Chinese counterparty. Toray said it is aware of the grey market in its products in China, some which are resold by the original importers with labels torn off. “When we see our product online we do our best to inform the merchant and they usually remove it,” said Toray. It never does repeat business with sellers caught violating end-user certificates.
东丽表示正在协助联合国调查，详细案情无可奉告，并拒绝透露涉事中国企业名字。东丽表示了解自身产品在中国存在灰色市场，其中一些商品是原进口商撕掉商标后再进行转卖。东丽表示：“一旦在网上看到我们的产品，我们会尽全力设法知会商家，他们通常会将该商品下架。”对于被发现违反最终用户证明规定的销售商，东丽将永远与其断绝商务往来。
The FT contacted multiple sellers of proliferation-sensitive technologies in China found via Alibaba.com and 1688.com, and all said they were willing to sell without licences and end-user certificates normally demanded of such transactions. Many said they were not aware that their products were controlled or restricted for export, adding that China does not control their products or require export licences. China’s customs service declined to respond to written questions from the FT
FT记者通过Alibaba.com和1688.com找到中国多个销售核扩散敏感材料的卖家，并与他们联络。这些卖家都表示，愿意在没有许可和最终用户证明的情况下销售商品——正常来说这类交易是需要这些证书的。许多商家表示，他们并不知道这些商品受到出口管制或限制。他们还表示中国并未对他们的商品进行管制，也未要求办理出口许可。中国海关没有答复FT记者以书面形式提出的问题。
Three factories which advertised Toray T700 high-strength carbon fibre on 1688.com were contacted by an FT reporter posing as a buyer seeking 4,000kg of the controlled filament – over half the amount seized in Singapore. All said they were willing to sell domestically without documentation – a violation of end-user certificates. One also expressed willingness to help avoid export controls. “[Toray T700 carbon fibre] is harder to import than to export,” said the seller, reached by phone in Shandong province. “Japan imposes restrictions on exports, but when we export from China, it depends on what we report it as to the customs.” He said “there should be no problems” if the material is reported as textile fibre instead of carbon fibre.
一名FT记者装做买家，想购买4000公斤东丽T700高强度碳纤维——这一购买量超过了新加坡截获量的一半——并与1688.com网站上推销这种受管制商品的三家厂商取得了联系。三家都表示愿意在没有相关文件的情况下在国内销售该产品——这其实违反了需办理最终用户证明的规定。其中一家还表示愿意帮助买家规避出口管制。这位山东省的卖家在电话中表示：“（东丽T700碳纤维）进口比出口难。日本对这种产品有出口限制，而从中国出口时，就看我们怎么向海关申报了。”他说，只要把产品申报为纺织纤维而不是碳纤维，“就不会有问题”。
Other Chinese factories manufacturing dual-use goods advertised on Alibaba.com said export controls were not an issue. Shanghai Cixi Instrument Company and Shanghai Changjin Metal Products Company, both of which make products controlled by the nuclear suppliers group regulations, said in interviews that there are no restrictions on the items’ exports by Chinese customs.
其他在Alibaba.com网站上推销军民两用商品的中国厂商也表示，出口管制根本不成问题。上海瓷熙仪器仪表有限公司(Shanghai Cixi Instrument Company)和上海长进金属制品有限公司(Shanghai Changjin Metal Products Company)都在生产受到核供应国集团相关规定管制的产品，但他们在访谈中却都表示，中国海关并未对这些产品的出口实施限制。
Alibaba is not the only site selling nuclear sensitive items. In May, King’s College researchers were able to buy a controlled MKS pressure transducer from a distributor in China using eBay.
阿里巴巴并不是唯一销售核敏感物品的网站。今年5月，国王学院的研究人员就通过eBay从一家中国经销商购买了一部MKS压力传感器。
Ian Stewart, one of the researchers, said the merchant did not request an end-user certificate, nor did the merchant have an export licence for the product. Pressure transducers can be used to control uranium centrifuge enrichment, and thousands are thought to have been procured illicitly by Iran’s nuclear programme since the early 2000s.
其中的一名研究员伊恩•斯图尔特(Ian Stewart)表示，商家并未要求提供最终用户证明，而且商家也没有该产品的出口许可证。压力传感器可用于控制铀离心浓缩，自本世纪初以来，伊朗核计划据信已非法采购了几千部压力传感器。
Some factories that have been targeted by sanctions for procuring and producing nuclear-sensitive materials have listings on Alibaba. Machine Sazi Arak, a company that has been sanctioned by the EU, the US and other countries for its work at Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor, is listed as a supplier of boilers, heat exchangers and petrochemical equipment.
某些因采购、生产核敏感材料而受到制裁的工厂也出现在阿里巴巴网站的卖家名录。曾因在伊朗阿拉克(Arak)重水反应堆的工作而受到欧盟(EU)、美国及其他国家制裁的Machine Sazi Arak公司也在该网站的供应商列表之中，显示为锅炉、热交换设备及石化设备供应商。
“When it comes to Alibaba’s responsibility, I think this is a tricky one. It would be very hard for Alibaba to monitor all the interactions that take place on its site,” said Mr Godsey. “However, it would be reasonable to expect the company to block companies that have been sanctioned by the UN, the EU, or others for proliferation from using the site to conduct business and procure goods.”
戈德西表示：“说到阿里巴巴的责任，我认为这是个很棘手的问题。阿里巴巴很难监控其网站上的所有交易。不过，对于那些因为核扩散活动受到联合国、欧盟或其他方面制裁的企业，阿里巴巴理应禁止它们利用其网站开展业务和采购商品。”
Alibaba’s popularity as a place for sellers of sensitive technology to advertise has prompted tougher efforts to crack down on listings that fall afoul of the company’s guidelines prohibiting “weapons of mass destruction [WMD] or its known associated agents”. A series of advertisements for uranium and gallium, which is used in the production of plutonium warheads for nuclear bombs, was taken down or changed to emphasise non-nuclear applications this year. However, one seller of uranium was still advertising on 1688.com as of Thursday, but within limits. The Hao Thai Lingshou mineral processing plant said it was willing to sell only domestically – not for export.
阿里巴巴网站规定，禁止销售“生化、化学、核武器、其他大规模杀伤性武器，及任何为其提供服务、使用说明、咨询、生产、助剂以及违反国际法相关规定的信息”。敏感技术卖家喜欢在阿里巴巴网站推销产品，促使阿里巴巴采取更大力举措取缔违背其规定的商品信息。今年以来，一系列铀和镓（后者可用于生产核弹的钚弹头）的广告被撤下，或者被修改以突出非核用途。然而，在9月25日，一家销售铀的卖家仍然在1688.com网站上打广告，但限制了销售范围。这家名为灵寿县浩泰矿产品加工厂(Lingshou Hao Thai minerals processing plant)的企业表示，只接受国内订单，不对外出口。
