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The hottest topic in many corporate boardrooms today is shareholder activism — or more specifically, the vulnerability of becoming the target of a shareholder activist and what to do about it. Instead of dreading this or, worse, have to defend against it, boards of directors should be proactive about getting out ahead of it. As insiders, we are in a better position to act on our fiduciary responsibility to represent the interests of shareholders than is an independent party, and we have more tools and power at our disposal to do so. Done right, this might result in some healthy, but managed changes.
如今，在许多公司的董事会议室里，最热门的话题是股东维权行动，更确切的说，是被维权股东盯上的可能性以及应对之策。董事会不应对此讳疾忌医，甚至拖到不得不奋力反抗，而是应当在问题出现前就主动出击。与独立当事人相比，我们作为董事会成员，处于更有利的地位，能更好地履行我们的受托责任，代表股东利益，而且我们掌握着许多工具和权力，来帮助我们做到这一点。若处理得当，这可能会带来一些控制得当的有益变化。
The influence the activists are having in the market has never been greater. Simply put, what they are doing is attracting more interest and more capital, now estimated at north of $115 billion, 10 times the levels of the 1990’s. Distributing their messages has also become easier. They often communicate via social media and business news channels to emotionally pressure management and collaborate with other shareholders.
如今，维权投资者的市场影响力之大，可谓前所未见。简言之，他们如今受到的关注更多，吸引的资金也更多，目前估计已经突破1150亿美元，是20世纪90年代的10倍。维权投资者“传经布道”也变得更加容易。他们经常通过社交媒体和商业新闻频道发表看法，借此向公司管理层施压，并与其他股东联合起来。
So what is a board of directors to do? Boards are empowered to protect shareholders, but many shareholders have become sympathetic to activists because they believe the system has inherent conflicts of interest; that directors are more interested in collecting paychecks and preserving their status quo than in exercising their fiduciary duty to shareholders.
那董事会应该怎么做？董事会被授权保护股东，但许多股东认为，现行体制存在内在利益冲突，而董事们更热衷于从公司领薪水、维持自身现状，而非履行对股东的信托责任，股东们因此对维权投资者持赞同态度。
Conversely, the board’s time horizon for creating value is by definition much longer than that of any one activist, and many boards and management teams feel activists are too short-term and just don’t get the complexities of the landscape in which they operate. Operating realities include balancing the interests of customers, suppliers, employees, and regulators. Implementing well-managed changes, while navigating these factors, often takes longer than investors may realize.
相反，董事会的价值创造投资期比任何维权投资者的都要长得多，许多董事会和管理团队感到，维权投资者过于注重短期收益，根本不了解企业经营领域的复杂性。经营企业需要平衡客户、供应商、员工和监管机构的利益。在兼顾上述因素的同时，引进管理得当的改变，所需要的时间，往往比投资者想的要长。
But there are many things public company boards can do to better align with their core responsibility to the stockholders—and they can do it in a way that is proactive and more long-term in nature than if it is in response to an activist.
不过，在更好地履行对股东的核心责任方面，上市公司董事会确实大有可为。而且，与应对维权投资者不同的是，董事会可以事前采取行动，并立足长远。
Here are three ideas, which are meant to be directional rather than prescriptive.
以下是笔者在此方面的三个想法，旨在抛砖引玉，并不要求一一照做。
Let shareholders air it out.
让股东畅所欲言
Most boards only receive input from reading reports by sell-side analysts, who are not their shareholders, and from the CEO and CFO, who directly talk to institutional shareholders. Imagine, as an executive, never meeting with your boss to get feedback, but instead receiving it filtered from someone on your staff. That’s essentially what happens for many boards.
大多数董事会对企业的了解，来自于阅读由卖方分析师撰写的报告，以及由企业首席执行官和首席财务官提供的信息。其中，卖方分析师并非企业股东，而企业首席执行官和首席财务官则直接与机构股东对话。试想，作为一名管理者，怎能从不与自己老板碰面以获取其反馈，而是听信自己员工的一面之词？然而，在许多董事会，现状都是如此。
The shareholders are ultimately the “boss” of the board in the sense that the board serves as their proxy for enhancing intrinsic value. Yet boards typically hear about shareholder concerns indirectly and often not attributed to any specific shareholder.
股东是董事会的“老板”，董事会是帮助股东增进企业内在价值的代理人。然而，董事会通常只能间接获悉股东看法，而且往往很难听到单个股东的看法。
A huge opportunity is missed without direct contact. This is exactly the opportunity the activists are availing themselves of by contacting blocks of shareholders to exchange views on underperforming companies and collaborating on remedies.
就这样，与股东直接接触的大好机会被白白浪费。而维权投资者正是抓住了这一机会，与大批股东进行接触，交换对业绩不佳的公司的看法，并共同寻求补救之法。
Boards should do the same. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this. For example, Coca-Cola Co. Director Maria Elena Lagomasino, Chair of the Compensation Committee, met directly with one large shareholder and also considered specific feedback derived from major institutional shareholders of Coke on the issue of executive compensation. This input led to the revised approach to equity compensation, communicated by her directly with shareholders through the company’s website.
董事会也应该这样做。要做到这一点，可以通过多种方式。举例来说，可口可乐公司（Coca-Cola Co.）董事、薪酬委员会主席玛丽亚o埃莱娜o拉格马西诺，曾就高管薪酬问题与一位大股东直接会面，并考虑可口可乐主要机构股东对该问题的具体反馈。可口可乐根据获得的反馈信息，对股权薪酬进行了调整。拉格马西诺通过公司网站，直接与股东就该调整进行了沟通。
This could even become part of a regular process. For example, a designated board member could invite large shareholders to periodic get togethers to air their thoughts and concerns. This feedback could either be summarized for the board by that board member or delivered directly by a representative from the group at a board gathering.
这甚至可能会成为常规做法。例如，可以指定一名董事，邀请大股东们参加定期聚会，畅谈自身想法和顾虑。股东们的反馈，可以由该董事向董事会简要概述，也可以由一名股东代表直接在董事会上进行陈述。
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is even more ambitious. It hosts more than 30,000 shareholders in Omaha annually and allows them more than six hours to ask unfiltered questions. Recently, Chairman and CEO Warren Buffett offered some sage advice on the subject. “I believe in running the company for shareholders that are going to stay, rather than the ones that are going to leave.”
在这方面，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）走得更远。该公司每年邀请3万多名股东齐聚奥马哈，股东们有6个多小时可以随意提问。关于这一点，伯克希尔哈撒韦董事长兼首席执行官沃伦o巴菲特最近给出了一条明智的建议。“我经营公司，是为了那些准备长期持有的股东，而不是那些准备短线操作的股东。”
If a designated director or a designated third party representing the board were to reach out to shareholders from time to time, both sides would learn and benefit. It would allow key directors to educate shareholders, as well as build credibility and a relationship before problems arise. In addition, shareholders can add insight to the board, because they often speak with competitors, customers, and suppliers of the company and can bring an “outside in” perspective that can be hugely valuable.
如果指定一名董事或第三方来代表董事会，时常与股东接触，董事会和股东都将从中受益。关键董事将有机会对股东进行教育，并在问题出现前树立信誉、建立关系。此外，股东可以同董事会分享自己的独到见解。股东往往与企业的竞争对手、客户以及供应商有接触，因而能提供“由外及内”的独特视角，这可能对企业极具价值。
Limit terms, but don’t install terms limits.
限制任期年限，但不限制任期届数。
This means setting up a mechanism for both attracting new directors with some of the skill sets of long-term shareholders, as well as a mechanism for rotation off the board to create room for new thinking, more diversity, and women.
这意味着建立相应机制，吸引具有部分技能组合的长期股东成为新董事，同时确立董事解聘机制，以便催生新思维、促进多元化、增加女性董事数量。
For removing directors, the solution that activists primarily advocate is a hard term-limit. As an alternative, many companies instead opt for a retirement age. I am not a fan of either. Why create a system that force out good board members?
对于解聘董事，维权投资者往往主张实行严格的任期限制。作为替代方案，许多公司通常是对董事设定退休年龄。我对这两种方案都不太赞同。为何要建立一个机制，迫使那些出色的董事让位？
Then again, most boards have at least one or maybe a few directors who are not adding as much value as a new member might bring and therefore represent an “opportunity cost.” Once directors are on a board, it can be extremely difficult to naturally rotate them off. Firing a friend is tough under the best conditions, and even more so because there is no economic incentive.
话又说回来，大多数董事会至少都有那么一位甚或好几位董事，创造的价值小于引入新董事可能带来的价值，导致了“机会成本”。一旦某人进入公司董事会，要想将其解聘决非易事，正所谓请神容易送神难。即便天时地利，炒朋友的鱿鱼都很难，在没有经济激励的情况下，更是难上加难。
It’s emotionally easier just to “wait it out.” This is even more complicated when a CEO inherits a board that was picked and groomed by her predecessor and doesn’t have the collective skills for her new strategy.
感情上，更容易的做法是“干等着”。而且，当首席执行官面对的董事会，成员全都是由前任首席执行官挑选并推荐，其技能组合不能满足企业新战略的需求时，事态将更加复杂。
My view is that boards would be well served to adopt a process that specifically outlines the rotation process and that is understood and implemented for new directors. In other words, limited terms, but not unified term-limits. By making this change for all new directors, it side-steps the issue of those already on the board, making it easier to implement on a go forward basis.
我认为，董事会应确立相应程序，明确规定新董事轮换机制，并确保该规定得到理解和执行。换言之，限制任期年限，但对任期届数不做统一限制。仅对新任董事适用上述改变，能有效规避来自于现任董事的阻力，从而使新规更易推行。
I lean toward a system in which each new member of the board agrees to hand in their resignation every six to eight years, with the idea being that some directors will be asked to serve multiple terms it they are uniquely qualified to help the CEO and company build value, but many will be thanked for their service and move on after that time frame.
我倾向于这样一个体系：每位新任董事都同意，每六至八年递交一次辞呈。如果有些董事在帮助首席执行官和企业创造价值方面，能发挥无可替代的作用，会被请求连任。至于那些没有突出作用的董事，将在企业对他们此前的服务表示感谢后，就此离开董事会。
The decision regarding whose resignations to keep, or whose to accept, could be made either by an appointed director, or by an absolutely confidential and binding majority vote of the other board members. This latter approach might be easier socially.
是否接受某位董事的辞呈，可由一位指定的董事，或其余董事绝对保密且具有约束力的多数票来决定。后一种做法可能更易实行。
Think like an activist.
像维权投资者那样思考。
Directors must insist on asking management to analyze strategic choices as an activist would: by looking at alternatives to the strategies the CEO is recommending. This is not typical. The more common pattern is for the CEO to consider options and present only the recommended one to the board.
董事们必须坚决要求企业管理层像维权投资者一样分析战略选择：审视在首席执行官推荐的战略之外，有何替代方案。这种做法十分罕见。通常的做法是，首席执行官在权衡各种战略后，仅向董事会介绍自己认为最好的战略。
The road not taken is the one the activist will surface so the board must have analyzed these alternatives. This means understanding what it would mean to get out of underperforming operations, split up the company and evaluate varying alternatives for measuring and handling excess cash versus the ones being recommended. If these choices are not discussed, the board will be poorly prepared to articulate and defend its alternative course.
维权投资者主张的，必然是企业未采用的战略。因此，董事会必须提前分析所有替代方案。这意味着弄清与首席执行官推荐的战略相比，放弃业绩不佳的公司、分拆企业、评估测量和处理过剩现金的各种替代方案意味着什么。如果董事会没有讨论上述选择，将在阐明和捍卫自身战略方面准备不足。
Importantly, an analysis of the break-up or private transaction value of a company that shows a higher value than where the stock is trading does not oblige a company to make a sale. There have been many times in history where macro-economic or other conditions have made the current stock market and private transaction values poor indicators of intrinsic value. The board’s duty is to enhance the latter, exercising its duty of care, by fully understanding what strategic choices the company is making and why.
重要的是，分析显示某企业的拆分或私人交易价值大于其股票市值，并不表示企业必须出售。历史上，由于宏观经济环境或其他条件，导致当前股市和私人交易价值偏离企业内在价值的例子并不鲜见。董事会的职责，是提升企业内在价值，行使审慎职责，充分理解企业做出的战略决策，以及做出决策的理由。
By proactively using their power to align with long-term shareholder value creation, boards can help companies avoid the disruption that a shorter-term activist agenda will bring.
通过主动利用手中权力，积极配合创造长期股东价值，董事会可以帮助企业避免维权投资者的短期议程将带来的混乱。
