评论
打印
An important milestone has been reached in global finance. For the first time, the currency of a developing country has joined the special drawing right (SDR) basket of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Chinese Renminbi has received this global recognition for the currency’s importance both in global trade and in cross-border financial transactions.
国际金融领域出现了一个重要的里程碑。一个发展中国家的货币加入了国际货币基金组织(IMF)的特别提款权(SDR)货币篮子，这是有史以来头一回。鉴于其在国际贸易和跨境金融交易中的重要地位，中国的人民币获得了这一全球认可。
This may herald the beginning of a fundamental shift in global finance that spells the end of hegemony by a small handful of advanced countries. Yet, it is in no one’s interest if the restructuring of the global financial architecture lowers the standards of the global financial system.
这或许预示着国际金融领域一个根本转变的开始，预示着少数几个发达国家的霸权的终结。不过，如果全球金融架构重组降低了全球金融体系的标准，那将是不符合任何人利益的。
Nowhere is this more important than on the issue of transparency. After all, what is the financial market but an efficient system for conveying information about the value of various assets. As the central bank for one of the most widely used currencies in the world and now a SDR currency, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) should no longer obscure so many elements of its own balance sheet.
在国际金融领域，透明度比在其他领域更重要。毕竟，金融市场归根结底是一种传递各种资产价值信息的高效率系统。既然人民币是世界上使用最广的货币之一，现在又成了SDR篮子货币之一，中国央行(PBoC)不应再对其资产负债表的这么多细节遮遮掩掩。
To begin, official Chinese data suggest that banks sold $272bn in foreign exchange to corporate and household customers from the beginning of August to the end of October. Typically, banks would satisfy customers’ demand for dollars by buying them from the foreign exchange reserve, thus leading to a roughly equivalent change in the reserve. Yet, the official foreign exchange reserve only declined by $125bn dollars in the same period. Given that the dollar was relatively flat in that period, it is difficult to reconcile the $150bn difference.
首先，中国官方数据似乎表明，从8月初至10月底，各银行向企业和家庭客户出售了2720亿美元外汇。通常情况下，银行在满足客户对美元的需求时，会向外汇储备购买美元，从而导致外汇储备发生大致等量的变动。然而，同期官方外汇储备只减少了1250亿美元。鉴于同期美元汇率相对稳定，1500亿美元的差额很难解释。
Market participants have made at least two educated guesses on what has made up the difference. First and foremost, perhaps the central bank did sell more dollars to banks on the spot market, but at the same time purchased dollar forwards from banks, which may allow the reserve to count the forward as liquid dollar assets. But when the forwards come due, the central bank would have to provide the dollars to banks and reveal losses to the reserve from earlier. Market participants are struggling to guess at the size and maturities of these spot-forward swaps.
市场参与者对这一差额做出了至少两种有道理的推测。第一个是，中国央行可能确实在现货市场向银行出售了更多美元，但同时向银行买入了远期美元，这样外汇储备或许可以把远期美元计为流动美元资产。但远期美元到期时，中国央行将不得不向银行提供美元，并披露早先发生的储备下降。市场参与者很难猜出此类现货-远期互换的规模和期限。
Also, were commercial banks ordered by the central banks to conduct these swaps with the PBOC? If so, the central bank should disclose the fact so that banks can disclose these administratively arranged swaps to their shareholders. Banks potentially bear large foreign exchange risks by having large net short dollar positions on their balance sheets. These risks may be attenuated if the counterparty is the central bank.
另外，商业银行是否在央行命令下与央行进行这些互换？如果是这样，中国央行应当披露这一事实，以便商业银行可以向股东披露此类行政安排的互换。银行如果在其资产负债表上持有大量美元净做空头寸，潜在就会承担很大的外汇风险。如果交易对手方是央行，那么这些风险或许就小一些。
Second, on the PBoC’s balance sheet, there is a mysterious category called “other foreign assets,” which dropped by some $85bn in August. Rumors have it that banks had provided required reserves to the central bank in dollars prior to August, which the central bank gave back to the banks in exchange for renminbi when outflows intensified in August. The central bank has not officially acknowledged whether this was the case. In addition, what else sits in this mysterious category, now still around $30bn?
第二个推测是，在中国央行的资产负债表上，存在一个名为“其他外国资产”的神秘类别，8月份这个类别减少了约850亿美元。有传闻称，8月之前，各银行已向央行提供了要求的美元储备，当8月份资本流出加剧时，央行把这些美元还给银行，换回人民币。中国央行尚未正式承认是否曾这么做。此外，在这个如今规模仍达到约300亿美元的神秘类别中，还有其他什么资产呢？
Also when the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced on July 5th 2015 that the PBoC provided money to the China Securities Finance Corporation, the central bank did not provide any details on the amount and structure of those facilities.
另外，中国证监会(CSRC)在2015年7月5日宣布中国央行向中国证券金融公司(China Securities Finance Corporation)提供了资金，而中国央行并未提供有关资金数量和此类安排结构的任何细节。
The data from the central bank suggests that in July, the central bank’s claims on non-bank financial institutions rose by Rmb200bn in July, but in June, PBoC’s “other assets,” another mysterious category, rose by Rmb274bn. Did the central bank spend Rmb200bn or nearly Rmb500bn to rescue the stock market in the summer?
中国央行的数据似乎表明，7月该行对非银行金融机构的债权增加了2000亿元人民币，但在6月，中国央行的另一个神秘类别“其他资产”增加了2740亿元人民币。今年夏季，中国央行是否支出2000亿元人民币——或者近5000亿元人民币——去拯救股市？
Now that the renminbi is on its way to becoming a reserve currency, the global financial community has a right to know how much liquidity the PBoC provided to the market rescue effort, and whether there are plans to expand or reduce its provision of financing to the equity market.
既然人民币即将成为一种储备货币，全球金融界有权利知道，中国央行提供了多少流动性用于救市，以及是否有计划增加或减少它提供给股市的资金。
At the press conference after the renminbi joined the SDR basket, Yi Gang, a PBoC vice governor, pointed out that “joining the SDR also means that the global community will have many expectations for China in the financial and economic arenas.”
在人民币加入SDR货币篮子之后的媒体吹风会上，中国央行副行长易纲指出，“加入SDR也意味着国际社会对中国在今后金融、经济领域各个方面的许多期许。”
Indeed, the expectation is significantly higher today. A key expectation, and one where there is little quarter for debate, is for the market’s understanding of the central bank’s own balance sheet to be informed by facts rather than by guesses and rumors.
的确，这些期许现在显著更高了。一个关键的、几乎没有分歧的期望是，市场能够根据事实（而不是猜测和传闻）理解中国央行自己的资产负债表。
