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One of the Chinese government’s emerging strategies for dealing with problem loans in the banking sector is a debt-for-equity programme — under which banks would write off struggling companies’ debts in return for taking equity stakes in them.
在中国政府应对银行业不良贷款的策略中，有一种是债转股计划。按照这种办法，银行会减记深陷困境的企业的债务，换取这些企业的股份。
However, many analysts object to this plan, which state media have reported will initially involve up to Rmb1tn ($154bn) in problem loans. Past bank crises, they say, have shown that lenders should write off non-performing assets immediately, or pass them on to specially created “bad bank” vehicles. Delaying the inevitable simply incurs more pain at a later date.
然而，许多分析师反对这一计划。据官方媒体报道，该计划最初将涉及最高1万亿元人民币（合1540亿美元）的不良贷款。对此，分析师表示，以往的银行危机证明，银行应马上减记不良资产，或将它们转移给专门成立的“坏账银行”。拖延无法回避的事，只会在以后招致更多痛苦。
As proposed, Beijing’s debt-for-equity programme instead doubles down on the adage that if you owe your banker a thousand bucks you are a debtor, but if you owe him a million you are his partner.
按照拟议中的方案，中国政府的债转股计划实际上验证了那句谚语：如果你欠一位银行家1000块钱，你是他的债务人；但如果你欠他100万，你是他的合伙人。
Take the first, and so far only, large-scale debt-for-equity swap to be presented to investors in detail. Stripped of legalese and circumlocutions, Huarong Energy’s statements to the Hong Kong stock exchange about a proposed Rmb17bn transaction with 22 bank creditors — and more than 1,000 supplier creditors — provide a fascinating insight into how messy these transactions can become.
考虑一下即将向投资者展示细节的首个大规模债转股置换交易——也是迄今唯一的一个。这一拟议中的交易规模为170亿元人民币，交易双方一方是华荣能源(Huarong Energy)，另一方是22家银行债权人和逾1000家供应商债权人。在剔除种种法律术语和冗词赘语之后，华荣能源提交给香港交易所(HKEx)的声明提供了引人入胜的视角，让人们一瞥这类交易可能达到的凌乱程度。
Huarong, whose primary assets are oilfields in Kyrgyzstan’s volatile Fergana valley, began life as China Rongsheng Heavy Industries, a private-sector shipbuilder. Chinese shipbuilders were the first casualties of the slowing domestic economy and the global shipping glut.
华荣的主要资产是位于动荡的吉尔吉斯斯坦费尔干纳盆地的几个油田。该集团的前身是民营造船厂中国熔盛重工(China Rongsheng Heavy Industries)。中国的造船厂是国内经济放缓和全球航运业供过于求的首批牺牲品。
As Huarong has told its investors, its shipbuilding business is, to all intents and purposes, a zombie operation. “Except for the continuous efforts in collecting outstanding receivables and realising existing inventories through sale, the operation of the group’s shipbuilding business has been minimal,” it has said.
正如华荣告诉投资者的，其造船业务实际上已沦为僵尸业务。该集团表示：“虽然本集团仍在努力不懈地透过收回未偿付应收款项及出售变卖现有存货，本集团造船业务的经营一直处于相当低的水平。”
Huarong announced its reincarnation as a Central Asian energy company in 2014, the year the price of crude plummeted from $115 a barrel to less than $50.
2014年，华荣曾宣布转型为一家中亚能源企业。就在那一年，原油价格从每桶115美元暴跌至不到50美元。
It was the corporate strategy equivalent of a Hail Mary pass in American football. Unfortunately for Huarong and its long-suffering creditors and shareholders, it was simply too late — and too desperate — a reinvention to save the company.
这是美国橄榄球中“万福玛莉亚传球”（Hail Mary pass，绝望之下使用、成功率极低的长传——译者注）的企业战略版。不幸的是，对华荣及其长期被套的债权人和股东来说，作为拯救企业的改造计划，这一转型来得太晚，希望太过渺茫。
By June 2015 the group was saddled with shipbuilding-related borrowings of Rmb22.4bn, of which Rmb17.9bn had to be repaid within a year. But rather than bow to the inevitable, Huarong begged 22 banks to which it owed Rmb14bn to cancel its debts in exchange for shares.
截至2015年6月，该集团与造船相关的贷款达224亿元人民币，其中179亿元人民币必须在一年内偿还。然而，华荣并未顺应不可回避的趋势，而是请求被其欠款140亿元人民币的22家银行取消其债务，换取华荣的股份。
If all goes according to plan, the bank creditors — which have not been formally identified but are reportedly led by one of China’s “big four” state lenders — will end up with more than 70 per cent of the company, with supplier creditors holding 15 per cent and existing shareholders 13 per cent.
如果一切按计划进行，这些银行债权人最终将持有该公司70%以上的股份，供应商债权人将持有15%，现有股东将持有13%。华荣的银行债权人身份并未正式公开，不过有报道称，为首的银行是中国四大国有银行之一。
As one analyst critical of debt-for-equity deals asks: “What do Chinese banks know about oilfield services? And if a big private company can get this sort of treatment, imagine what state-owned enterprises are going to get.”
正如一位对债转股交易持批评态度的分析师所问的：“中国各银行对油田服务有何了解？如果连大型民营企业都能获得如此待遇，想象一下国有企业会怎样。”
So far 12 bank creditors owed Rmb12.9bn have provisionally agreed to the swap. Huarong’s supplier creditors, however, who are owed Rmb3bn in total, are proving more reluctant. As of March creditors holding just Rmb323m, or 11 per cent, of Huarong’s IOUs were willing to accept shares in lieu of repayment.
到目前为止，已有被欠款129亿元人民币的12家银行债权人初步同意了债转股置换交易。然而，总计被欠款30亿元人民币的供应商债权人被证明不太情愿。截至3月份，在持有华荣借条的债权人中，只有被欠款3.23亿元人民币的供应商债权人愿意接受用股份代替偿债，比例为11%。
