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The RAND report assesses that “Russian ground forces have local dominance along its European and Central Asian borders.”
兰德研究所的报告评估称，“俄罗斯的地面部队在欧洲及中亚边境沿线占有主导地位。”
In many ways, Ukraine is a testing ground for the kind of fight that could ultimately break NATO.
从很多方面来看，乌克兰都只是一个试验场，俄罗斯的最终目的是要挑起战争分化北约。
Brian Nichiporuk, one of the report’s coauthors, raised the specter of what he called a “smash and grab” operation—
报告联名作者布莱恩·尼克波瑞克声称，日后，俄罗斯可能还会展开“粉碎抢夺”行动——
where Russia launches a rapid invasion of, say, Estonia,
比如，迅速入侵爱沙尼亚，
immediately incorporates the invaded nation into its formidable defense perimeter,
立即将被入侵的爱沙尼亚纳入其强大的防御体系，
and presents the invasion to the world as a virtual “fait accompli.”
并昭告天下所谓的入侵不过是“既成事实”。
Would the U.S. commit its forces to a brutal, bloody battle to liberate its NATO ally?
美国会为了其北约盟友的解放率兵加入一场残酷而血腥的战斗吗？
Or would the likelihood of serious casualties—combined with the difficulty of the operation—
又或者，严重伤亡的可能性——加上行动的难度——
cause the public to demand that America abandon Estonia to its fate?
会促使民众要求美国袖手旁观，让爱沙尼亚听天由命吗？
If so, could the NATO alliance survive intact after Russia demonstrated
若果真如此，要是俄罗斯已经用行动表明，在其实力和意志面前，强权也要为之折腰，
that the combination of its might and will could make a superpower yield?
北约联盟还能毫发无损地渡过难关吗？
These sound like esoteric, theoretical questions—far removed from the daily lives of the American public.
这些听着仿佛都是些艰深的理论问题，仿佛与美国民众的日常生活相去甚远。
But these are exactly the kinds of strategic questions that Presidents and their advisers should ponder.
但它们却是总统及总统顾问们需要考虑的那种战略问题。
Here’s one way to phrase those interests — an effective Ukrainian defense against Russian aggression
我们可以这样理解这些利害——乌克兰对俄罗斯侵略的有效防御
raises the cost of that aggression and (crucially) raises the perceived cost of future aggression.
会提高俄方侵略的成本，也会无形之中提高俄方未来侵略的感知成本。
Ukraine needed lethal military aid, and Congress appropriated money to fund that aid.
乌克兰需要军事援助，美国国会也为此拨了款。
Now we know that there was a dissenter— the President of the United States.
眼下，我们已经知道，此事引起了某人的反对，这个人就是美国总统。
And he dissented not because he’d made a careful (though contentious) assessment of America’s best strategic interests,
但他之所以反对并非因为他对美国的最佳战略利益做了仔细的(尽管大家对此的看法存在争议)评估，
but rather because he was nursing various domestic American political grudges against the Bidens driven by unfounded conspiracy theories.
而是出于他对拜登家族怀有的，被莫须有的阴谋论挑起的种种政治怨念。
We need Commanders in Chief who are strategic in their thinking and motivated by the American national interest.
我们需要的统帅是具有战略思维、服从美国国家利益的统帅。
Trump, by contrast, is ignorant, impulsive, vulnerable to conspiracy theories, and motivated by his own personal grievances and grudges.
相比之下，特朗普只是一个无知、冲动、动辄叫嚣阴谋论，服从个人的不满与怨念的统帅。
Eight months ago, I argued that an election, not an impeachment,
8个月前，我曾提出，要追究特朗普的罪责，
was the way to hold President Trump accountable for his misdeeds.
正确的途径应该是选举而非弹劾。
The Ukraine scandal changes the calculus.
然而，乌克兰丑闻改变了这一格局。
It demonstrates that the President will inject his vices even into the most consequential decisions.
该丑闻表明，即便是最重大的决策也逃不出他荼毒国家政事的魔爪。
译文由可可原创，仅供学习交流使用，未经许可请勿转载。
