评论
打印
In a literature review published in 2020 Gavin Kilduff of the Stern School of Business at New York University, Blythe Rosikiewicz of West Chester University and Christopher To of Rutgers University concluded that competition is more likely to backfire when people feel threatened: for example, when the costs of losing are high or when people are competing against others known to be better at the task in question.
在2020年的一篇文献综述中，纽约大学斯特恩商学院的加文·基尔达夫、西切斯特大学的布莱斯·罗西凯维奇和罗格斯大学的克里斯托弗·托得出结论，当人们因竞争而感到威胁时，竞争最有可能适得其反：例如，当失败的代价很高，或者当人们知道对手更擅长某项任务但还是必须与其竞争时。
But even when the stakes are low, explicit competition can backfire.
但即使在风险较低的情况下，显性竞争也可能适得其反。
In an experiment conducted by Jeffrey Carpenter of Middlebury College and his co-authors in 2007, participants were asked to stuff envelopes. When people were paid a bonus for stuffing the most envelopes, they worked harder than if they got a flat per-envelope fee.
2007年，米德尔伯里学院的杰弗里·卡彭特及其合著者进行了一项实验，参与者被要求把信装进信封。当装信封最多的人可以获得额外奖金时，他们比只能装多少就挣多少的时候工作得更努力。
But when they were also given a chance to sabotage their peers to get ahead, the (correct) expectation that they themselves would be sabotaged made people work less hard than if they had got piece-rate pay.
但当他们也可以破坏同事的工作以获得领先优势时，他们预期(这种预期是正确的)自己的工作也会遭到破坏，这让他们比计件获得报酬的时候更不愿努力了。
Such behaviour arises because many people—and many of them men, since women tend to be less taken by the prospect of all-out competition—like winning for its own sake. This organic aspect to competition also shows up in rivalries between individuals.
这种行为之所以会出现，是因为很多人——大部分是男性，因为女性往往不太喜欢拼尽全力去竞争——喜欢为了赢而赢。竞争的这一天然方面也体现在个人之间的竞争中。
Workers tend naturally to benchmark themselves against their peers in the race for status and seniority; they don’t need an excuse.
在社会地位和职位等级的竞争中，人们天然地倾向于以同辈为标准进行比较，这样做不需要任何理由。
These specific rivalries can be especially motivating. A paper from 2018 by Adam Galinsky and Brian Pike of Columbia Business School and Mr Kilduff found that teams in a range of American sports performed better the year after an intense rival did well in tournaments.
这些具体的竞争可能会特别有激励作用。哥伦比亚大学商学院的亚当·加林斯基和布莱恩·派克以及基尔达夫在2018年发表的一篇论文发现，当劲敌在锦标赛中表现出色，接下来的一年，美国各种运动队就会表现更出色。
In another study, Lisa Ordonez of the University of Arizona and Messrs Kilduff, Schweitzer and To analysed American-football games and found that teams were more likely to take risky on-field decisions against fierce rivals.
在另一项研究中，亚利桑那大学的丽莎·奥多涅斯和基尔达夫、施维茨尔、托分析了美式橄榄球比赛，发现球队在面对强大的对手时，更有可能在场上做出冒险的决定。
Particular opponents encourage greater risk-taking than generic competition, at least if you are a very large man in tights.
特定的对手比一般的竞争更能鼓励人们冒险，至少对于穿紧身球衣的大块头橄榄球运动员来说是这样。
All of which argues for a restrained approach to encouraging competition. Balance individual incentives with group ones. If you are going to rate performance, make sure the measures are clear, objective and fair. Think about when risk-taking is more desirable (sales, say) and less desirable (clinical trials).
所有这些研究都提倡以克制的方式鼓励竞争。要平衡个人激励和团体激励。如果你要对绩效进行评级，请确保衡量标准明确、客观和公平。想想什么时候更鼓励冒险(比如销售)，什么时候不鼓励冒险(比如临床试验)。
By their nature organisations crackle with competitiveness. Adding a bit of fuel to the fire can be fine. Spraying petrol everywhere is unnecessary.
从本质上讲，组织里充斥着竞争。往火里加一点燃料是无妨的。但到处喷汽油就大可不必了。
