Sailing into troubled waters

A struggle to control oil exports reflects deeper dysfunction

“OIL IS our strength”, declares a billboard campaign launched by Libya's oil ministry. The advertising is meant to foster national pride in a country still riven with regional and tribal faultlines three years after the ousting of its dictator, Muammar Qaddafi. But in Libya's restless eastern half, sometimes known as Cyrenaica, armed federalists are trying to make that slogan a political reality.

Since July a group calling itself the Cyrenaica Political Bureau has blockaded Libya's main oil ports, the country's chief source of income. Its initial pretext was to protest against alleged fraud in oil-export accounts, but its ambitions have widened. On March 11th it pulled off a coup, successfully loading and dispatching 234,000 barrels of crude oil—worth about $30m—aboard a North Korean-flagged tanker, in defiance of the central government.

The drama has set the scene for what some analysts fear could be a descent into deeper disorder. The eastern rebels are no match for the better-armed government-aligned forces, and ordinary Cyrenaicans have little appetite for another all-out war, particularly given bitter local rivalries. But there is still a danger that the authorities in Tripoli may overplay their hand to the point of provoking full-scale rebellion in the east.

In moving to oust Mr Zeidan, the GNC asserted itself as Libya's prime authority. But it is divided along factional lines and has few tools to impose its writ. Blaming the ex-premier for the tanker fiasco, it also directed the state prosecutor to charge him with embezzlement. Mr Zeidan still managed to flee to Germany.

In fact, many Libyans view the GNC as dimly as they had come to regard Mr Zeidan. Behind its manoeuvrings many see the hand of powerful Islamist groups, led by the Justice and Construction Party, which is affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. Frequently during Mr Zeidan's year-and-a-bit in office, these groups moved to stymie his government's initiatives. The newly installed interim prime minister, Abdullah al-Thinni, a former defence minister, is thought to be close to the Islamists, as is the speaker of the GNC, Nuri Abu Sahmain. Both men are supported by the country's best-armed militias, based in the city of Misrata, whereas Mr Zeidan was backed by armed groups from Zintan, to the southwest of Tripoli.

These rival forces have clashed around Tripoli for several months. In the wake of Mr Zeidan's ejection the city's military council, which co-ordinates Tripoli's various local militias, issued an order for the withdrawal of “forces occupying strategic positions”. This was seen as a warning to the Zintan group, which controls the capital's main airport among other places.

The main city in the east, Benghazi, has meanwhile become increasingly insecure. Near-daily bombings and assassinations appear to be aimed at undermining any authority, to the advantage of jihadist factions that seek to impose Islamic law. With oil exports slumping from 1.4m barrels a day to around 235,000, the central government has plundered the country's foreign reserves to keep salaries flowing. It is not clear how long it can afford to continue.

These ingredients make a combustible mixture. Fighting in the east could provoke a wider insurrection there; and deepening disorder in Tripoli could tempt other local authorities, especially those in the deep south, to declare their autonomy. Should a Brotherhood-friendly government emerge in Tripoli, neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Algeria would become twitchy.

Libya may yet drag itself back from the brink. Rather than attempting to hold their ground at Sirte, the Cyrenaican rebels quietly pulled back to the old border line that demarcates the former federal region, which was abolished in 1963. Optimists point out that Mr Zeidan was ousted by an elected body, and left without a shot fired. GNC members have promised fresh national elections by midsummer. But just now that looks awfully distant.