Carrie Lam had been in the job as Hong Kong’s chief executive less than a month when she threatened to shut its financial community in a room until it sorted out the city’s markets. That might have sounded extreme but, just days later, one of the likely prisoners responded with an analogy of the situation that involved the city’s regulator bringing out its “handcuffs, tear gas and big guns”.
香港特首林郑月娥(Carrie Lam,见上图)就任还不到一个月,就威胁要把该市的金融界关在一间屋子里,直到他们解决香港市场的问题。这可能听起来有点极端,但就在几天后,其中一名可能被关在屋子的人士做出回应,把当前局面比喻为该市监管机构祭出“枪枝、手铐等多种大火力武器”。
Hong Kong’s financial watchdogs are toughening their language. And in a city where the stock market is at the heart of its financial power — played by rich and poor alike — that means something. Asked about suspected cases of market manipulation, including the small-cap crash in July that wiped $6bn off stocks in hours, Ms Lam told a forum that the city needed stronger leadership in the sector. “We need to bring together our regulators and our market development practitioners,” she said, “and perhaps lock them in a room and let them find out the way forward for Hong Kong.”
香港的金融监管机构正在放出狠话。在股市位于其金融实力核心、穷人和富人都在股市操盘的这个城市,这是有相当大分量的。在被问及疑似市场操纵个案(包括7月份小盘股崩盘,导致60亿美元市值在几小时内蒸发)时,林郑月娥对一个论坛表示,该市金融业需要更强有力的领导。她表示,香港需要汇集监管者和市场发展从业人员,也许把他们锁在一间屋子里,让他们找到香港的前进道路。
Charles Li, chief executive of the Hong Kong exchange, then brought handcuffs to the party, defending the HKEX’s actions by likening its position to a traffic cop against the sheriff role played by the city’s watchdog, the Securities and Futures Commission.
香港交易所(HKEx)行政总裁李小加(Charles Li)随后用手铐做比喻,捍卫港交所的行动,将其比作一个交警,在职责上有别于“刑警”——该市金融监管机构证券及期货事务监察委员会(SFC)。
“Standard gear for the traffic cop is a whistle, a night stick and an alcohol detection device,” wrote Mr Li in a blog last week. “Those tools are effective to control the traffic, but are not terribly useful when it comes to apprehending suspects or deterring violations. The sheriff’s department is, however, equipped with big flashlights, handcuffs, tear gas and big guns. Those heavy weapons do not work well with the general traffic but they are highly effective in capturing and deterring criminals.”
“交警仅配备哨子、指挥棒、酒精探测器和路障设置等,”李小加上周在一篇博文中写道。 “在日常交通管制上,这些工具是有效的,但碰到重大案件时没有什么威慑力。而刑警则配备各类枪枝、手铐等多种大火力武器,必要时还可以进行搜查与拘捕。这些武器可威慑罪犯,并非为管理普通民众而配备的。”
Confronted with such a convoluted analogy, most Hong Kong market players would probably prefer the simplicity of a locked room and an order from Ms Lam to produce a solution. But the problems involved are too complex for a quiet room and a pot of coffee to solve.
面对这样一个复杂的类比,大多数香港市场参与者很可能更喜欢林郑月娥的简洁言论:一间上锁的房间,由她下令拿出一个解决方案。但是这里涉及的种种问题太过复杂,不是一间安静的房间和一壶咖啡能够解决的。
At its heart, the city is battling to make a system with its roots in the colonial era suitable to maintain its status as a leading global centre for initial public offerings — all the while coping with the flood of Chinese companies and capital that raised it to the top of the rankings in the first place. Problems have inevitably followed, not least shares that can rocket and plunge for no clear reason. Another wrinkle has been so-called “shell farming”, where companies list in the expectation a majority stake will eventually be bought by another group keen on a listing without the rigours of an initial public offering.
问题的核心是,该市正在努力调整一套根植于殖民时代的制度,使其适合维持香港作为一个全球领先的首次公开发行(IPO)中心的地位——与此同时应对内地企业和资本的洪流,正是这股洪流使香港升至排行榜首位。各种问题不可避免地接踵而来,尤其是股价会出现貌似无厘头的大涨大跌。另一个问题是所谓的“啤壳”,即公司上市的初衷就是让急于上市、但不想走IPO严格审批程序的另一家集团买下其多数股权。
But not all problems emanate north of the border. Hong Kong has its own rich history of financial shenanigans. Insider trading, after all, was not criminalised until 2003. Tycoons including Li Ka-shing were among those censured when a rap on the knuckles was all the authorities could do. Mainland press still refer darkly to the tricksters — loh tsin in Cantonese — believed to lurk amid the smaller stocks in the Hong Kong market.
但并不是所有问题都源自内地。香港历史上的金融欺诈手段并不少见。毕竟,内幕交易直到2003年才被界定为刑事犯罪。包括李嘉诚(Li Ka-shing)在内的大佬都曾受到批评,而批评是那时当局能够采取的最严厉行动。内地媒体仍然阴暗地提到粤语所称的“老千股”(大股东不以做好上市公司业务来盈利,而是采取不正当手段占小股东便宜的股票——译者注),据信香港市值较小的股票中有一些这类股票。
One headache is just how to tackle all the problems, and in what order. Recently both the HKEX and the SFC have begun acting more aggressively in individual cases to block IPOs or question capital raisings. In the past year, the two have also consulted on streamlining the listings process, reforming the city’s junior market and creating an entirely new board that could allow dual-class shares — a sore point for the city since it lost Alibaba’s float to New York in 2013 over that issue.
令人头痛的是如何解决所有这些问题,以及按什么顺序来解决。近期,香港交易所和证监会均已开始对一些个案采取更加强势的行动,阻止IPO或质疑资本募集操作。过去一年里,两家监管机构还发起了一系列意见征询,涵盖精简上市流程、改革香港初级市场,以及创建一个可能允许双层股权结构的新市场——自2013年香港因为这个问题而与阿里巴巴(Alibaba)的上市失之交臂,导致该公司赴纽约上市以来,这一直是香港的一个痛点。
But most agree there is one single problem that even Ms Lam is powerless to solve — the fact that the regulators have limited powers to pursue directors, executives and traders across the border whatever officials say about mainland co-operation. On one occasion, the chairman of a listed group flatly told the SFC he could not guarantee co-operation by the group’s Chinese parent — in spite of the fact he controlled that company.
但是多数人认为,有一个问题是就连林郑月娥也无力解决的,它源于这样一个事实:监管者在追究内地董事、高管和交易员的责任方面权力有限,无论官员们就内地合作说些什么。有一次,一家上市集团的董事长坦白地告诉证监会,尽管他控制着该公司,但他无法保证集团的内地母公司会配合。
“It is all very well being traffic cops and sheriffs, but what do you do when most of the miscreants are driving around with the equivalent of diplomatic plates?” asks one long-time equity market specialist.
“有关交警和刑警的比喻都很好,但在多数歹徒用外交牌照开车的时候,你怎么办?”一名长期研究股市的专家问道。
Which is one way of saying it will take more than tough talk and extensive analogies to work through the many issues facing Hong Kong’s markets.
这也就是说,要解决香港市场面临的诸多问题,需要的不只是狠话和长篇比喻。