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The yawning divergence between the political economies of China and the west has once more become the sub-text of crucial efforts to avert a surge in trade protectionism.
在力求避免贸易保护主义浪潮高涨这场至关重要的行动背后，再一次隐含着中西方政治经济学的巨大差异。
The US, EU and Japan last week ramped up pressure on China on trade, subsidies and intellectual property issues. In a rare effort towards international co-operation by the Trump administration, the three issued a statement on the sidelines of a World Trade Organization meeting in Buenos Aires last week that took aim at “severe excess capacity” in steel and other sectors and the role of illegal subsidies and state-owned enterprises in causing it.
美国、欧盟(EU)和日本在贸易、补贴和知识产权问题上加大了对中国的施压。它们上周在布宜诺斯艾利斯世界贸易组织(WTO)会议的间隙发表了一份声明，这是特朗普(Trump)政府在国际合作方面的罕见努力。声明把矛头指向了钢铁和其他行业的“严重产能过剩”，以及非法补贴和国有企业在其中扮演的角色。
The statement, which also targeted the forced transfer of intellectual property, did not name China directly. But officials have made clear that China is the statement’s main target, though not the only one. The intention behind the trilateral alliance is to avert a lurch towards protectionism by wringing concessions from Beijing.
该声明也针对强制转让知识产权的做法。声明中没有直接提到中国。但有官员明确表示，中国是该声明的头号目标，尽管不是唯一的目标。三方联盟背后的意图在于迫使北京方面做出让步，从而避免滑向保护主义。
But from a broader perspective, such mounting tensions represent an existential test for the global trading system. At issue is whether China’s state-driven, hybrid system has become so divergent from free-market principles that fruitful co-operation is precluded.
但从大局来看，这种日益加剧的紧张关系使全球贸易体系面临一场生死攸关的考验。问题在于，中国由国家驱动的混合体制是否已与自由市场原则偏离太远，以至于无法开展富有成效的合作。
The hope of “convergence” with the liberal economic order that attended China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 appears dead. Beijing has launched suits at the WTO against the US and EU for failing to follow through on what it claims was their promise to accord China “market economy status” within 15 years of its accession into the world trade body. China wants to be regarded officially as a market economy because such a designation boosts its ability to fight dumping cases against it.
2001年中国加入世贸组织时，外界曾希望中国“融入”自由经济秩序，如今这种希望似乎破灭了。北京方面已针对美国和欧盟向世贸组织提起诉讼，理由是它们没有履行当年关于中国入世15年后给予中国“市场经济地位”的承诺。中国希望被正式视为市场经济，因为这会提高其应战对华反倾销案的能力。
Multinationals operating in China complain of a deteriorating environment, with nearly 50 per cent of European firms reporting in 2016 that it has become more difficult to do business in China than in the previous year. The American Chamber of Commerce similarly reported in 2017 that more than three-quarters of its member companies felt less welcome. The World Bank’s ease-of-doing-business ranking places China 78th out of 183 countries, and the OECD puts it fourth-to-last among 62 countries evaluated on restrictions to foreign investment.
跨国公司抱怨在华经营环境恶化，2016年近50%的受访欧洲企业称，在中国做生意的难度比上一年加大了。美国商会(American Chamber of Commerce)同样在2017年表示，超过四分之三的会员企业感觉受欢迎程度下降。在世界银行(World Bank)的“经商便利度”排行榜中，中国在183个国家中排名第78位；经合组织(OECD)对62个国家的外商投资限制进行评估，中国的宽松度位列倒数第4。
Some of the reasons behind such perceptions derive from its technology drive. In 2015, it announced its “Made in China 2025” policy, which targets higher market shares in 10 global industries. The scheme is nakedly nationalistic, aiming to boost “indigenous innovation” and self-reliance in the manufacture of key components.
这些评价有一部分原因与中国的科技发展战略有关。2015年，中国公布了“中国制造2025”政策，目标是在全球10个行业占据更大市场份额。该计划带有赤裸裸的民族主义色彩，希望在关键部件制造方面加强“自主创新”和自力更生。
