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The pilgrimage of Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras to Moscow told a tale of two tragedies. One, perilously close to the denouement, is about Greece’s uncertain place in the family of European nations; the other, still unfolding but with a storyline that foretells a calamitous final act, is about the future not just of the euro but of European integration.
希腊总理亚历克西斯•齐普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)此次莫斯科之行讲述了两个悲剧故事。第一个是关于希腊在欧洲国家大家庭中岌岌可危的地位，这个悲剧眼下正危险地走向结局；第二个悲剧不仅是关于欧元、而且是关于整个欧洲一体化的未来，尽管这个悲剧尚在慢慢展开，但是故事脉络已经预示了一个灾难性的结局。
Predictably enough, the Greek prime minister was feted by Vladimir Putin. The Russian president’s revanchist aggression in Ukraine has left his regime more vulnerable than anyone in the Kremlin would dare admit. Mr Putin badly needs to weaken the EU sanctions regime. Shared Orthodox Christianity, an air of leftist nostalgia in Athens and, above all, Greece’s desperate isolation make it an ideal target for Moscow’s strategy of divide and rule.
不出所料，这位希腊总理受到了弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)的盛情款待。这位俄罗斯总统对乌克兰展开的报复性攻击，致使其政权脆弱到了克里姆林宫所有人都不敢承认的地步。普京迫切需要削弱欧盟的制裁当局。共同的宗教信仰——东正教(Orthodox Christianity)，雅典空气中弥漫的左翼怀旧主义，以及最重要的——希腊目前绝望的孤立状态，使希腊成了莫斯科分治之策的理想目标。
It is harder to see what Mr Tsipras gains beyond a few warm words to cheer his supporters at home. The promise of a gas pipeline years hence? Any aid on offer from Moscow would be minuscule relative to funds from the EU and the International Monetary Fund. There is nothing Mr Putin could do that would make leaving the euro any less painful.
除了收到几句温暖的问候外，很难看出齐普拉斯还能得到什么来让国内的支持者高兴起来。对数年后建设一条天然气管道的承诺？与希腊从欧盟及国际货币基金组织(IMF)获得的资金相比，莫斯科能够提供的任何援助都会显得微不足道。无论普京做什么，也不可能减轻希腊脱离欧元区的痛苦。
The other day I heard Yanis Varoufakis explain how Greece had ended up here. The finance minister’s is a story fluently told — of US backing for the colonels, of the havoc wreaked on industry by the free trade rules of the EU, of the Brussels funding that bankrolled clientelist politics in Athens and of how cheap euros created a ruinous bubble.
有一天，我听到了亚尼斯•瓦鲁法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)解释希腊是如何落到如此地步的。在这位希腊财长滔滔不绝的讲述中，这是一个关于美国过去支持希腊军政府、欧盟自由贸易规则导致工业大遭摧毁、欧盟的资金资助了雅典的庇护政治、以及廉价的欧元是如何酿成毁灭性泡沫的故事。
There are elements of truth in this; and Mr Varoufakis is right when he says the present debt burden is unsustainable. Missing from the narrative, though, is any sense that Greece must make its own choices. That, whatever the sins of others, only Athens can decide whether Greece prospers as a modern democracy or whether it slips back into the shadows of the Balkans.
这其中有些真实的元素；当说起目前的债务负担难以为继时，瓦鲁法基斯也没错。然而在他的叙述中，丝毫没有希腊必须自己做出选择的意思——无论别人有什么罪恶，只有雅典人才能决定：希腊是作为一个现代民主国家繁荣昌盛，还是退回到巴尔干半岛的阴影之下。
The omission, and the implicit rebuke to outsiders who do not feel bound by ballots cast by Greeks, is at the heart of what so frustrates Athens’ partners. This is not just about the Germans, even if Wolfgang Schäuble, Berlin’s finance minister, foolishly lends credibility to the idea. Mr Tsipras is isolated among fellow debtors as much as creditors. What unites them is a demand that Athens produce a plausible plan to reform the Greek state — to modernise its administration and politics as much as its economy. Such a plan would transform the mood of negotiations.
这种缺失、以及对那些并不认为自己受到希腊投票束缚的局外人的隐晦指责，才是如此困扰希腊的伙伴的问题核心。受困扰的不仅仅是德国人，即便德国财长沃尔夫冈•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble)愚蠢地支持这种想法。无论是在同命相连的债务国、还是在债权人当中，齐普拉斯均受到孤立。让他们团结一致的是，他们都要求雅典出台一个可行计划来对希腊整个国家进行改革——让行政机制、政治以及经济实现现代化。这样的计划将会改变整个谈判的氛围。
Mr Putin’s preference is otherwise. A collapse in Greek living standards would leave it ripe for the coercion and subversion that are Russia’s trademarks in an effort to expand its influence and control in southeastern Europe. The Russian president already has Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban in his breast pocket. His agents are working hard — exploiting Russia’s energy monopoly, buying politicians, bribing officials and taking stakes in financial institutions — to promote instability across the Balkans.
普京想要的就是另外一回事了。希腊的生活水平一旦崩溃，将使之成为胁迫和颠覆的合适对象——为了达到在欧洲东南部扩大影响力及增加控制的目的，这是俄罗斯惯用的伎俩。这位俄罗斯总统已经把匈牙利的维克托•欧尔班(Viktor Orban)收入囊中。普京手下的特工也在努力在巴尔干半岛增加不稳定性——利用俄罗斯的能源垄断、收买政客、贿赂官员并在金融机构中投资入股。
Yet talk to finance ministers and central bankers across the rest of Europe and the mood is one of fatalism. They will tell you that the eurozone would withstand Greece’s departure. This is not 2008, or even 2012, they say. Governments have put in place the mechanisms to deal with crises. Some sound as if they believe that, freed from the vicissitudes of Greek politics, the euro would be stronger in the long run.
不过，如果跟欧洲其他国家的财长和央行行长聊聊，他们的感觉是听天由命。他们会告诉你，欧元区能经受起希腊离开。他们说，如今的情形不是2008年，也不是2012年。各国政府已经出台了处理危机的机制。摆脱了希腊变化无常的政治，从长远来看欧元会更加坚挺——有些人听起来似乎对此深信不疑。
In a narrow sense they may be right, though I would not bet on it. But Greece is a distorting prism. Its sequential crises have bred complacency by distracting from the profound structural flaws and political challenges that still imperil the euro. Making monetary union work demands more than proficient crisis management.
从狭义上讲，他们可能是对的，虽然我不会对此下注。但是希腊是一块扭曲的棱镜。其接二连三的危机已经导致了掉以轻心，因为它们分散了人们的注意力，使人们忽视了目前仍然威胁着欧元的深层次结构缺陷及政治挑战。让货币联盟运转，需要的不仅仅是熟练的危机管理。
Spring has seen a burst of sunshine in the European economy. The European Central Bank’s quantitative easing is having an effect. Growth has picked up a little. Yet it is a delusion to think that the euro is in Asafe harbour. Fiscal and financial union are at best half-completed, and the political threat to the euro continues to grow.
今年春天欧洲经济已经迎来了一缕阳光。欧洲央行(ECB)的量化宽松政策正在起到作用。增长略见起色。不过，如果就此认为欧元已经抵达安全港，那只是错觉。财政和金融联盟最多只完成了一半，而欧元面对的政治威胁还在持续增加。
National politicians refuse to admit the supranational imperatives of the project they are pledged to safeguard. And a return to growth rates of 1 or even 2 per cent will not be enough to restore the euro’s legitimacy among the angry voters who are turning to populist movements of right and left.
各国政客有义务捍卫欧洲一体化，可他们拒不承认超国家的义务。增长率重回1%、甚至2%，在愤怒的选民们当中将不足以恢复欧元的合法性，这些人正转向右翼和左翼民粹运动。
In 2012, European leaders defied the markets by summoning up the political resolve needed to save the single currency. They have since lost the will to sustain it. Greece may not bring down the euro; the existential threat lies in the more generalised failure of nerve and leadership.
2012年，欧洲领导人挑战了市场，拿出了拯救欧元单一货币的必要政治决心。自那以来，他们就失去了维持这一决心的意愿。希腊或许不会拖垮欧元；生死攸关的威胁存在于更普遍的勇气丧失与领导失败。
So it is, too, in the relationship with Moscow. The biggest danger to Europe comes not from the forays of Mr Putin’s rusting aircraft carrier, or his cold war-vintage nuclear bombers, or from Soviet-style subversion in some of the darker corners of the continent.
所以，对俄罗斯关系也是如此。欧洲面临的最大危险并不来自普京那些生锈航空母舰的突袭，或者他那些冷战时期的古董核轰炸机，或者他在这个大洲某些更黑暗角落里苏联式的颠覆活动。
No, the real weakness lies in a European mindset that prefers to temporise and equivocate than to confront Mr Putin head on. Mr Tsipras’s visit may have held up a mirror to Greece’s troubles. But it also offered a reflection of diffidence and division across Europe. If Greece does fall out of the euro it will also fall out of Europe. And the failure of the euro would mark the failure of Europe. What unites these twin tragedies is the stubborn reluctance of the authors to rewrite the endings.
不是，欧洲真正的弱点在于欧洲人的观念，他们对普京更愿意妥协拖延和含糊其辞，而不愿正面对抗。齐普拉斯的访问或许折射了希腊的麻烦，但也折射出整个欧洲的缺乏自信和意见分歧。如果希腊确实会在欧元区掉队，那么它也将在欧洲掉队。欧元的失败也将标志着欧洲的失败。这两个悲剧的共同之处在于，作者们坚决不愿重写结局。
