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The flavour of the new policy in operation was conveyed by a report in the New York Times, 2 March 1954, on progress made in the previous year: '... the State Department, a principal target of Senator McCarthy, had separated 117 employees as “security risks”, of whom forty-three had allegations of a subversive association in their files and forty-nine had been listed as having in their files “information indicating sex perversion”.
1954年3月2日，《纽约时报》报道了新政策几年来的实施情况："……国务院以『安全隐患』为由，解雇了117名雇员，其中43人涉嫌持有颠覆性的观点，还有49人涉嫌性变态。
In the big super-secret Central Intelligence Agency ... there were forty-eight “security risk” separations, of whom thirty-one were included with information indicating perversion ...'
在高度机密的中央情报局……有48名『安全隐患』被解雇，其中31人涉嫌性变态……"
Positive vetting was now applied to those 'privy to the whole of an important section' of 'a vital secret process, equipment, policy, or broad strategic plan...' a description which would cover anything significant done by GCHQ.
这种针对性审查，广泛应用于"所有涉及到机密信息、设备、政策或战略计划的重要部门"，这样的描述，覆盖了政密学校的一切活动。
There might have been more. He was, in particular, the 'Deputy Director' of the laboratory where the atomic bomb calculations were in progress, and might well have been consulted at an early stage about this use of the computer.
图灵知道的还不止这些，他还在负责原子弹计算工作的实验室里当过副主任。很有可能在早期阶段就被咨询过关于电脑的使用。
Ferranti Ltd were also engaged upon guided missile development. Yet these were almost common knowledge, in comparison with the subject which was to remain unmentionable for another twenty years.
另外，他与弗兰蒂公司来往甚密，而弗兰蒂公司参与过导弹的研制。然而，相对于图灵脑子里的其它东西来说，这些都算不上什么"机密"。
